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ABSTRACT 
LIEUTENANT SCOTT MCBRIDE, U.S. COAST GUARD:  Leveraging the Power of 
Relationships:  A Case Analysis of the City of Tuscaloosa and 
the American Red Cross’ Response to the April 27, 2011 Tornado 
 (Under the Direction of Lois Boynton, Ph.D., Queenie Byars, LT Joseph Klinker) 
 
On April 27, 2011, an EF-4 tornado, larger than a mile wide in diameter, touched 
down in Tuscaloosa, Alabama resulting in 53 fatalities, 1,200 injuries and widespread 
damage and destruction throughout the city.  In less than six minutes, the storm destroyed 
over 12 percent of the city and left 7,000 people unemployed.  This study is a 
comprehensive case analysis that investigates the role inter-organizational relationships 
played between the City of Tuscaloosa and the American Red Cross during the pre-crisis, 
crisis, and post-crisis phases of the disaster response.   
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CHAPTER I:  Introduction 
If you were to open a newspaper, turn on the television or surf the Internet, you 
will not have to look hard to find any number of organizations that are experiencing some 
form of crisis.  Whether it is caused by human-error or “acts of God,” crisis can come in 
all types, be unpredictable, and have potentially irreparable effects on an organization’s 
reputation and existence.  Organizations willing to invest time, energy, resources, and 
preparation into crisis management may mitigate the effects of a crisis or potentially 
prevent one from even occurring in the first place (Hoffman, 2011).  However, despite an 
organization’s best efforts, in some cases, such as natural disasters, crisis can be difficult 
to avoid.   
In recent years, a string of natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, 
droughts, floods, and tornadoes have devastated communities and regions across the 
country, leaving an indelible mark on those who were affected.  Because of the 
unpredictability and severity of some of these events, disasters have costs in lost lives and 
resources spent.  Additionally, disasters have created crises and tested emergency 
management capabilities for local, state, federal, and non-government organizations.  In 
the spring of 2011, one such event gave the ultimate test of emergency preparedness, 
crisis management, and disaster response to the City of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and its 
population more than 90,000 residents (“Facts,” n.d.). 
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At approximately 5:13 p.m. on April 27, 2011, an E-4 tornado, larger than a mile 
in diameter, touched down in the city of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and carved out a six-mile 
path of destruction (Lynch, 2011).  In less than six minutes, 12 percent of the city was 
destroyed and more than 7,000 people became unemployed.   The deadly storm destroyed 
or damaged over 5,000 residences, damaged over 600 businesses, injured over 1,200 
people, and resulted in 53 fatalities.  In addition to the costly damages experienced by the 
citizens and residents of Tuscaloosa, the city’s emergency management resources were 
greatly impacted in the wake of the storm.  Several elements of Tuscaloosa’s 
infrastructure were severely damaged or destroyed including the facility that housed the 
county’s Emergency Management Agency (EMA), communication towers, over 50 
vehicles from the Environmental Services Department, a fire station, police station, and 
numerous other response equipment and resources.  On April 27, 2011, the City of 
Tuscaloosa was experiencing a crisis. 
The purpose of this study is three-fold: to advance the scholarly literature in the 
discipline of crisis management and crisis communication; to provide an informative, 
practical, and in-depth case-study for crisis managers, academics, and public relations 
practitioners; and to conduct a research-based study to advance the U.S. Coast Guard’s 
and Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) corporate knowledge in the discipline of 
crisis communication and crisis management.  Specifically, this study will investigate the 
role inter-organizational relationships played between the City of Tuscaloosa and the 
American Red Cross during the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis phases of the disaster 
response.   
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Although the crisis in Tuscaloosa may be over, rebuilding efforts are ongoing and 
continue today.  What lessons can emergency managers take away from this terrible and 
tragic event?  How did inter-organizational relationships affect internal and external 
coordination and communication with stakeholders?  How can future organizations 
strengthen relationships and cultivate partnerships internally and externally so that they 
are better prepared and equipped when faced with a crisis of similar or greater 
magnitude?  What are some key takeaways about the role partnerships and inter-
organizational relationships can play in non-disaster related crises?  In order to answer 
these questions and others, this study will provide a case analysis using Coombs (2012) 
three-stage approach to crisis, to examine the relationships between the City of 
Tuscaloosa and the American Red Cross and their response efforts, from the time of the 
initial tornado warning to the conclusion of post-crisis operations.  This study will consist 
of:  
• An overview of crisis management, crisis communication, and relationship 
management literature related to theory, organization, methods, and 
phases 
• A background of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
• A background of the Red Cross and the City of Tuscaloosa 
• A statement of research questions and methods used to evaluate the local 
response 
• A comprehensive narrative of the City of Tuscaloosa’s and the American 
Red Cross’s response during the aftermath of the tornado 
	   4	  
• A discussion and evaluation of the decisions and actions of the City of 
Tuscaloosa and the American Red Cross during all three phases of the 
crisis 
• Recommendations for the future regarding inter-organization cooperation 
and relationships 
Coast Guard Advanced Education Requirement 
In the aftermath of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, Deep Water Horizon, and countless 
other events, the Coast Guard continually seeks best practices and lessons learned so it 
can better respond to future crises.  Part of my requirement as a Coast Guard-funded 
graduate student is to conduct research that not only advances my own professional and 
educational development, but also benefits the service as a whole.   
Because the Coast Guard is relatively small, with a little more than 40,000 active 
duty and reserve personnel, the service understands the importance of relationship 
building and inter-organizational partnerships.  The Coast Guard continually seeks to 
cultivate relationships around the country with its port partners, industry, and other 
government agencies in order to effectively execute its missions.  In a time of shrinking 
budgets and limited resources, partnerships between agencies play a crucial role in the 
Coast Guard's ability to interdict drugs, prevent pollution, save lives, and defend the 
homeland.  Despite limited resources, the Coast Guard is expected to do its job 
professionally, efficiently, and effectively.  In ports where interagency relationships 
thrive, the Coast Guard as well as its port partners, are better prepared and equipped to 
respond to potential crisis events.    
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Despite the many benefits of inter-organizational relationships and the myriad 
lessons learned from recent events, some organizations have yet to realize the importance 
of partnerships or have failed to see that a need even exists for cooperation.  Many 
organizations fail to realize how relationships can act as a “force multiplier,” especially in 
times of crisis.  As Coombs (2000) points out, "crisis managers must be shown how they 
can apply a relational approach to crisis management" (p. 77).   
In an attempt to illustrate the importance of relationship management and inter-
organizational cooperation to potential partners and crisis managers, the Coast Guard has 
requested that I conduct research related to this topic.  Because of the Coast Guard’s 
intimate familiarity of maritime-related incidents and crises, I chose to conduct a study 
involving a non-maritime event with the hope of expanding our overall corporate 
knowledge.  Fink (1971) states that, “no organization is immune to encounters of 
disappointment or failure…. Far from being a prelude to failure as an organization, such 
crises may actually be occasions for renewed growth and the beginning of truly 
outstanding success” (p. 16).  The willingness to observe and learn lessons, both from 
within our own organization, and externally by observing the actions of others, will only 
strengthen our service as we move ahead to better serve the public.  
  
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER II:  Literature Review 
The field of crisis communication has grown over the past decade or so in both 
the professional and academic communities due to an increased demand for effective 
crisis management within organizations (Coombs, 2010).  As an applied discipline by 
nature, crisis communication research is designed to employ theory to solve real-world 
problems for crisis managers and organizations.  From a managerial perspective, crises 
cost money, which provides plenty of incentive for organizations to invest resources in 
order to avoid, respond, and mitigate the potential threat (Heath, 2010).  Therefore, 
Coombs (2000) states that, “crisis managers want tools they can use in the heat of crisis” 
(p. 77).   
In order to understand the importance of the role of inter-organizational 
relationships in crisis management and crisis communication, a thorough review of the 
scholarly literature is required to provide a solid foundation and background for this 
study.  This literature review will focus on the relevant theories related to crisis 
management, crisis communication, and relationship management in hopes of 
illuminating any gaps in the extant scholarly works.  
Crisis Defined 
Before proceeding, there needs to be a definition of crisis that is both broad and 
categorical (Klinker, 2010).  Unfortunately this could be a difficult task.  According to 
Coombs (2010), there is no single universally accepted definition of crisis.  In fact, 
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Adkins (2010) states that, “establishing clear and distinct definitions for the term crisis 
has been a problematic issue in communication scholarship for many years” (p. 96).  
Scholars such as Shaluf, Ahmadun (2003), and Said have a similar assessment stating 
that the definition of crisis differs from one organization to another.  One potential reason 
for a lack of universality of a crisis definition is because those who have defined the term 
come from a variety of academic and professional disciplines and backgrounds, some of 
which include public relations, management, and organizational communication 
(Coombs, 2010).   
Despite the variety of definitions, conceptual similarities do exist for how of crisis 
is defined (Coombs, 2010).  For example, Weick (1995) describes crisis as low 
probability-high impact events that place severe demands on sense-making for both 
participants and decision-makers.  Similar to Weick’s definition, Pearson and Clair 
(1998) define crisis as “low probability, high-impact situations that [are] perceived by 
critical stakeholders to threaten the viability of the organization and that [are] 
subjectively experienced by these individuals as personally and socially threatening” (p. 
66).   
According to Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger (2007), the definition of crisis is 
dependent on the unexpected nature of the event, non-routine demands of the 
organization, production of uncertainty, and the threat to high-priority goals.  Hoffman’s 
(2011) definition of crisis includes a problem of great magnitude that comes at a critical 
juncture.  Hoffman further states that a crisis interrupts an organization’s ability to 
conduct business, which could ultimately affect the way it is perceived by its stakeholders 
and the public.  Lastly, Ruff and Aziz (2003) define crisis as “any incident or situation, 
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whether real, rumored or alleged, that can focus negative attention on a company or 
organization internally, in the media or before key audiences” (p. 3).   
Although many definitions exist on how researchers and professionals define the 
term “crisis,” Coombs and Benoit account for the primary research stream as well as the 
majority of published studies on crisis management and communication in public 
relations (Avery et al. 2010).   According to Coombs (2012), crisis is defined as the 
“perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of 
stakeholders and can seriously impact an organization’s performance and generate 
negative outcomes” (p. 2).  Although crises are considered to be anomalies and difficult 
to predict in most cases, Coombs (2010) states that they are to be expected.  The key 
point to Coombs’ (2012) definition is that crisis is perceptual and the perceptions of 
stakeholders are what define an event as a crisis.  Like Coombs, Benoit also points to the 
relevance of perception.  According to Benoit (1997), when it comes to the image of an 
organization, regardless of whether or not they are responsible for some unfavorable 
action, “perceptions are more important than reality” (p.  178).   
It should be noted that practitioners believe a distinction exists between incidents 
and crises.  According to Coombs (2010), practitioners believe that “crisis should be 
reserved for serious events that require careful attention from management” (p. 19).  
When the term “crisis” is used, organizations tend to allocate additional time, attention, 
and resources to the situation (Billings, Milburn, & Schaalman, 1980).  Coombs’ broad 
and categorical definition of crisis as an unpredictable threat that affects organizations 
and their stakeholders, will be the baseline used for the remainder of this study as I 
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discuss the theories of crisis management, crisis communication, and relationship 
management. 
Crisis Management Framework 
As previously mentioned, the discipline of crisis communication has witnessed 
tremendous growth over the past decade due to an increased demand for effective crisis 
management and crisis communications.  As we move forward to understand crisis 
communication, it is important that we understand its relationship with crisis 
management.  Coombs (2010) explains this relationship by stating that, “crisis 
communication is a critical element in effective crisis management” (p. 21).  
Furthermore, Coombs (2012) states that, “crisis communication is the lifeblood of crisis 
management” (p. xi).  When an organization’s crisis communication efforts are 
ineffective, their crisis management efforts become ineffective as well.  Lastly, Coombs 
(2010) states that any discussion of crisis communication cannot be conducted without 
fully understanding and exploring crisis management and its processes.  For these 
reasons, I will begin to explore the crisis management process by briefly discussing its 
roots, defining the terms, and reviewing the process. 
Crisis management gets its roots from the field of emergency and disaster 
management, where it focused on how organizations cope with incidents (Coombs, 
2010).  In addition to providing ways on how to cope with situations, emergency and 
disaster management detailed incident prevention and response.  It was not until 1986, 
when Steven Fink published his seminal work:  Crisis Management: Planning for the 
Inevitable, that the field of crisis management began to emerge and take form (Coombs, 
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2010).  Unlike disaster management, which focused on incident prevention and response, 
crisis management became a field of study focused on organizational crises. 
Definition of Crisis Management 
According to Coombs (2010), crisis management is defined as “a set of factors 
designed to combat crisis and to lessen the actual damages inflicted” (p. 20).  In other 
words, crisis management protects organizations and stakeholders from harm by 
attempting to prevent or mitigate the negative outcomes of crisis (Coombs, 2012).  Crisis 
management comprises of four interrelated factors of prevention, preparation, response, 
and revision to either address the crisis or mitigate the damage inflicted.   
Coombs (2012) defines prevention as the steps that are taken to avoid a crisis.  
These steps might include the creation of a crisis management plan (CMP), which is an 
organizational document that contains important information needed to manage a crisis.  
Preparation also includes diagnosing vulnerabilities, choosing and training spokespersons 
and crisis management team members, creating a crisis portfolio, and refining the crisis 
communication system.   
The response factor, often considered the most public and critiqued, involves the 
actual response to the crisis (Coombs, 2012).  The response factor not only applies all the 
preparation components, it uses all the crisis management resources as well.  One 
element that can help organizations become more effective during the response is to test 
the preparation components regularly, which through simulated exercises, helps 
“determine the fitness” of crisis team members and the CMP.  Coombs points out that an 
organization with a diversity of exercise scenarios will be better prepared to handle future 
	   11	  
crises.  The final step to the response factor is the recovery, where organizations return to 
normal operations and business continuity is achieved. 
The fourth factor in crisis management is called revision.  During revision, 
organizations evaluate the crisis response and create a set of lessons learned for future 
events (Coombs, 2012).  Organizations thoroughly review positive and negative aspects 
of the response in order to develop insight into how to better prepare for future crises.  
When revisions are utilized by organizations, past mistakes can be avoided and the crisis 
management ability and response capacity become improved. 
Publics and Stakeholders 
Before I explore Coombs’ three-stage approach to crisis management, it is 
important to define the terms ‘publics’ and ‘stakeholders.’  These terms will be used 
throughout this case analysis, so it is important to define them now.  The distinction 
between ‘publics’ and ‘stakeholders’ can be difficult to differentiate.  According to 
Mackey (2006) the term ‘stakeholder’ has “become ubiquitous throughout business and 
political literature and is also common in public relations textbooks and journal articles” 
(p. 1).  Cutlip, Center, and Broom’s (2000) definition of ‘public’ involves people who are 
interdependent with organizations.  
According to Mitroff and Pearson (1993), stakeholders consist of institutions, 
individuals, and groups who either affect or are affected by an organization.  Coombs 
(2012) defines stakeholders as “persons or groups that have interest, right, claim, or 
ownership in an organization” (p. 37).  According to Coombs stakeholders can be 
primary or secondary.  Primary stakeholders consist of individuals or groups, “whose 
actions can be harmful or beneficial to an organization” (p. 37).  Examples of primary 
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stakeholders include investors, employees, customers, suppliers, and the government.  
Coombs defines secondary stakeholders as “those people or groups who can affect or be 
affected by the actions of an organization” (p. 37).  Examples of secondary stakeholders 
include activist groups, media, and competitors.  Because stakeholders are linked 
economically, socially and politically to an organization, one cannot underestimate the 
importance of their roles in crisis management.  Because the definitions of publics and 
stakeholders both involve interdependence with organizations, I will use the terms 
interchangeably throughout this study. 
Three-Stage Approach to Crisis Management 
  According to Coombs (2010), fields of research develop when models are used.  
Models not only help people understand processes but they also assist with 
comprehension of key concepts.  Coombs also points out that, “examining the crisis 
management process allows us to understand better the critical points where crisis 
communication enters the equation” (p. 22).  For these reasons, it is entirely appropriate 
to explore Coombs’ three-stage approach to crisis management.   
According to crisis management literature (Coombs, 2012; Gonazales-Herrero & 
Pratt, 1995; Sturges, 1994), crises have identifiable life cycles.  It is incumbent upon 
managers to be familiar with the life cycles because the different phases require specific 
actions (Gonzalez-Herrero & Pratt, 1995; Sturges, 1994).  Coombs (2012) translates the 
crisis life cycle using a staged approach to crisis management.  His three-stage approach 
grew from the influential crisis management models developed by Fink (1986) and 
Mitroff (1994).   
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In his book, Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable, Fink (1986) uses a 
medical illness metaphor to illustrate his four-stage crisis lifecycle.  Mitroff (1994) 
followed up Fink’s model by creating a five-phase model of crisis management.  
According to Coombs (2012), both crisis management models were similar and valuable, 
noting that the biggest difference between the two is the prescriptive nature of Mitroff’s 
model compared to the descriptive nature of Fink’s model.  Out of these two models 
came Coombs’ simplified three-stage model, which used insights from Fink and Mitroff 
as well as additional information from crisis management experts.  Coombs’ model 
defines the crisis life cycles in three distinct phases: pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis.  
Coombs’ (2012) model is not only simplified and provides a  “macro-level generality” to 
analyze crisis management, it also accommodates the dominant models in the field and 
allows for integration of ideas from crisis management experts.   
Pre-crisis 
 It is fair to state that each step of the three-stage crisis management approach is 
important to crisis managers.  Decisions and actions made during each stage will 
ultimately determine the outcome and perception of overall success of the organization’s 
response to a crisis.  The first step in this process is what Coombs (2012) calls the pre-
crisis stage.  During the pre-crisis stage, Coombs suggests that members of the 
organization take proactive measures to ensure that a crisis is prevented.  The pre-crisis 
stage consists of actions that should be conducted prior to a crisis and is made up of three 
sub-stages that are: (1) signal detection, (2) prevention, and (3) crisis preparation.   
During the signal detection sub-stage, crisis managers look for warning signs with 
hopes of preventing a potential crisis (Coombs, 2012).  Signal detection includes 
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scanning both the internal and external environments for crisis warning signs.  As 
information is collected during this stage, it is important that analysis is also conducted 
on incoming data to ensure potential warning signs are detected.  
Following signal detection is the prevention stage.  During crisis prevention, crisis 
managers take proactive measures in attempts to prevent or avoid a crisis (Coombs, 
2012).  The crisis prevention stage is a five-step process that includes scanning sources, 
collecting and analyzing information, taking preventative action and evaluating the 
effectiveness of threat reduction.  The last sub-stage in the pre-crisis phase includes crisis 
preparation.  During this stage, organizations make preparations for “inevitable crises”.  
Organizations prepare for “inevitable crises” by diagnosing vulnerabilities, assessing 
crisis types, choosing and training crisis team members, selecting and training a 
spokesperson, creating a CMP, and reviewing the crisis communication system (Coombs, 
2012). 
One important element that occurs between the pre-crisis and crisis response 
stages is crisis recognition.  Crisis recognition is not considered one of the formal stages 
of Coombs’ three-stage approach, but the importance of its role is worth mentioning.  
According to Coombs (2012), not all crises are obvious and easy for organizations to 
recognize.  Recognition of a crisis can be difficult for organizations because crisis is 
dependent on the perception of their stakeholders.  As previously mentioned, a situation 
becomes a crisis when stakeholders perceive that one exists.  Even when stakeholders 
perceive a crisis within an organization, some members of management may deny that 
one exists (Fink, Beak, & Taddeo, 1971).  Fink et al. attribute this denial to a 
psychological alarm, which he calls defensive retreat, when anxiety caused by crisis is 
	   15	  
followed by a fight-flight pattern.  Finally, once a crisis is recognized, information must 
be collected and synthesized to ensure successful management of the crisis (Coombs, 
2012). 
Crisis Response 
The next stage to Coombs’ three-stage model consists of the crisis response.  
According to Mitroff (1994), during this stage, an organization’s crisis team works to 
“contain the effects of a crisis from spreading further and, hence, from infecting other 
uncontaminated parts of an organization or the environment” (p. 106).  It is during this 
stage when the first statements are made to the public regarding the crisis and first 
impressions are formed regarding the organization’s response and communication efforts 
(Coombs, 2012).  Messages are typically communicated to stakeholders and publics 
through some sort of mass media such as the television or Internet.   
Coombs (2012) emphasizes that organizational responses to a crisis should be 
quick during the crisis response stage.  Quick responses not only fill the information void, 
but they also ensure that the organization maintains control of the message and the public 
receives the “organization’s side of the story” (p. 141).  According to Barton (2001), as 
technology advances, the window of opportunity that crisis teams have to respond to the 
crisis will continue to decrease.  Lastly, Coombs (2012) emphasizes the importance of 
open, two-way communication with stakeholders.  Continuous, open, two-way 
communication between the organization and stakeholders is not only the lifeblood of a 
favorable organizational-stakeholder relationship, it is also essential to the crisis 
management team’s ability to contain, mitigate, and recover from the crisis.   
Post-crisis 
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 According to Coombs (2010) the Chinese characters for crisis represent threat and 
opportunity.  It is fair to state that Coombs’ final stage of the three-stage approach 
represents the optimum time for opportunity for crisis managers.  During the post-crisis 
stage, the situation is considered to be resolved and operations are able to return to a 
normal state for businesses and organizations.  Even though the crisis may appear to be 
resolved, it’s important for crisis managers to continue to manage the after-effects, even 
after response operations have ceased.   
Two important elements of the post-crisis stage include continuation of crisis 
communication and organizational learning (Coombs, 2010).  According to Coombs, 
post-crisis communication consists of keeping stakeholders up-to-date on business 
continuity efforts.  Like organizations, stakeholders desire a need to return to a state of 
normalcy.  To satiate stakeholder needs, it’s important that crisis managers provide 
regular updates to their publics regarding the status of operations.  Updates create a sense 
of calm and balance as well as give the perception to stakeholders that operations are 
back to normal. 
Another important aspect of the post-crisis stage involves organizational learning 
(Coombs 2010).  According to Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), a crisis creates excellent 
opportunities for organizations to learn valuable lessons.  Organizations learn through 
data collection, analysis, and evaluation of their crisis management efforts (Coombs, 
2012).  Evaluations allow for organizations to review the decisions and actions made by 
crisis managers, in an effort to improve the overall crisis management process.  
Unfortunately, many organizations remain reluctant to review their actions post-crisis out 
of fear of finger pointing, blame, and potential repercussions for past errors and mistakes 
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(Coombs, 2010).  For this reason, organizations miss out on a tremendous opportunity to 
improve their crisis management processes for the future.  However, organizations that 
are willing to take the time and energy to learn from past crises will reap the benefits of 
improved performance during future events (Coombs, 2012).  Now that there has been a 
thorough review of the crisis management process, which included Coombs’ three-stage 
approach, we can discuss the relevant theories of crisis communication. 
Crisis Communication 
 It was mentioned earlier that crisis communication is an essential element of crisis 
management.  Coombs (2010) takes this a step further by stating that, “communication is 
the essence of crisis management” (p. 25).  Because a crisis creates a demand for 
information by stakeholders and publics, communication plays a crucial role in the crisis 
management process.  Communication allows information to be collected, processed and 
shared by organizations.   
Coombs (2010) emphasizes the importance of differentiating between the two 
“basic types” of crisis communication: (1) crisis knowledge management, and (2) 
stakeholder reaction management (p. 25).  Crisis knowledge management is the internal 
process that identifies potential sources of crisis, information collection and analysis, 
knowledge sharing, and decision-making.  Crisis knowledge management is the type of 
crisis communication that takes place “behind the scenes” and involves the creation of 
public responses by the crisis team.  On the other hand, stakeholder reaction management 
consists of external communications efforts, through actions and words, to influence the 
stakeholder’s perception of the crisis. 
Reputation Management 
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 One important element of crisis communication that needs to be discussed 
involves the concept of reputation management.  According to Allen & Caillouet (1994), 
one of the main goals of crisis communication is to protect an organization’s reputation. 
Coombs (2010) further states that, “reputations matter because it is an important 
intangible resource for an organization” (p. 38).  However, an organization’s reputation 
can be damaged and its legitimacy threated during any crisis, regardless if the 
organization it at fault or not.  For these reasons, public relations and marketing research 
began to investigate how crisis response strategies could be utilized to protect an 
organization’s reputation during a crisis.  In order to determine which crisis response 
strategies were appropriate for certain situations, researchers turned to attribution theory 
as a useful framework for matching the correct crisis response to the crisis situation 
(Coombs, 2012). 
 Coming from the research of Bernard Weiner (1986), attribution theory is based 
on the idea that people will attribute responsibility for negative and unexpected events 
(Coombs, 2012).  According to Coombs, because crises tend to be negative and 
unexpected, they also tend to “provoke attributions of responsibility” (p. 153).  
Consequently, these attributions ultimately frame how stakeholders view and behave 
towards an organization.   
 Coombs and his colleagues developed Situational Crisis Communication Theory 
(SCCT), in 1995, under the same premise of attribution theory, which held that 
stakeholders make attributions about crisis responsibility, and that these attributions 
ultimately affect how stakeholders interact with these organizations (Coombs, 2010).  
According to Coombs (2012), SCCT uses attribution theory to diagnose the threat to an 
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organization’s reputation.  Once the threat is diagnosed, SCCT recommends crisis 
response strategies, which are determined by the reputational threat level.  Reputational 
threat levels are determined by crisis type, crisis history, and prior reputation of an 
organization.   
The first step in assessing the reputational threat to an organization is to identify 
the crisis type (Coombs, 2012).  Crisis types can range from accidents and earthquakes to 
terrorism and whistle blowing (see Figure 1).  The next step in evaluating reputational 
threat is to conduct an assessment based on an organization’s prior crisis history and 
reputation.   
Two theoretical tenants in crisis communication involve the Velcro and halo 
effects.  According to Coombs and Holladay (2001), organizations with a history of 
crises or prior negative reputation will tend to attract additional reputation damage, like 
Velcro.  This is known in the field of crisis communication as the Velcro effect.  Whereas 
organizations without any prior negative performance history will be given the benefit of 
the doubt by its stakeholders.   
Contrary to the Velcro effect, the halo effect, stemming from Ledingham and 
Brunig’s (1998) relational management perspective, posits that an organization’s 
favorable relationship history with its stakeholders along with its crisis history, will 
protect it from reputational damage during a crisis.  Despite this common-sense 
hypothesis, Coombs and Holladay (2001) came up with a different conclusion.  Coombs 
and Holladay concluded that a positive performance history or halo and a neutral or 
nonexistent performance history actually have no effect on an organization’s reputation 
during and after a crisis.  Regardless of an organization’s past history, its reputation is 
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important and selecting the appropriate response to counter the threat will play a crucial 
role in their ability to survive a crisis.  Once an organization assesses the reputational 
threat, crisis management can select the appropriate crisis response strategy (see Figure 
2).   
Figure 1: Crisis Typologies (Coombs, 2012, p. 73) 
Crisis Type Definition 
Natural disasters When an organization is damaged as a result of the weather or “acts 
of God” such as earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, and bad 
storms. 
Workplace 
violence 
When an employee or former employee commits violence against 
other employees on the organization’s grounds. 
Rumors When false or misleading information is purposefully circulated 
about an organization or its products in order to harm the 
organization. 
Malevolence When some outside actor or opponent employs extreme tactics to 
attack the organization, such as production tampering, kidnapping, 
terrorism, or computer hacking. 
Challenges When the organization is confronted by discontented stakeholders 
with claims that it is operating in an inappropriate manner. 
Technical-error 
product harm 
When the technology utilized or supplied by the organization fails 
and results in a defect or potentially harmful product. 
Technical-error 
accidents 
When technology utilized or supplied by the organization fails and 
results in a defect or potentially harmful product. 
Human-error 
accidents 
When human error causes an accident. 
Human-error 
product harm 
When human error results in a defect or potentially harmful product. 
Organizational 
misdeeds 
When management takes actions it knows may place stakeholders at 
risk or knowingly violates the law. 
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Figure 2: Situational Crisis Communication Theory Recommendations for Crisis 
Response Selection (Coombs, 2012, p. 159) 
 
 Recommendations 
1. Provide instructing information to all victims or potential in the form of warnings 
and directions for protecting themselves from harm. 
2. Provide adjusting information to victims by expressing concern for them and 
providing corrective action when possible.   
Note: Providing instructing and adjusting information is enough of a response for 
victim crises in an organization with no crisis history or unfavorable prior 
reputation. 
3. Use diminishment strategies for accident crises when there is no crisis history or 
unfavorable prior reputation. 
4. Use diminishment strategies for victim crises when there is a crisis history or 
unfavorable prior reputation. 
5. Use rebuilding strategies for accident crises when there is a crisis history or 
unfavorable prior reputation. 
6. Use rebuilding strategies for any preventable crisis. 
7. Use denial strategies in rumor crises. 
8. Use denial strategies in challenges when the challenge is unwarranted. 
9. Use corrective action (adjusting information) in challenges when other 
stakeholders are likely to support the challenge. 
10. Using reinforcing strategies as supplements to the other response strategies. 
11. The victimage response strategy should only be used with the victim cluster. 
12. To be consistent, do not mix denial strategies with either diminishment or 
rebuilding strategies. 
13. Diminishment and rebuilding strategies can be used in combination with one 
another. 
 
Now that we’ve addressed the relevant theories associated with crisis 
communications, we can move ahead to talk about the final piece relevant to this case 
analysis, the relational perspective of crisis management.   
Crisis Management: A Relational Perspective 
 Because this case analysis will examine the role of relationships between the 
American Red Cross and the City of Tuscaloosa during the tornado of 2011, it is 
important to review crisis management from a relational perspective.  It also makes sense 
to examine the relational perspective because crises are “episodes in the ongoing 
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relationship between an organization and its stakeholders” (Coombs, 2000, p. 73).  
According to Coombs, understanding the relational perspective not only provides crisis 
managers with valuable insights regarding the crisis, but also allows them to develop 
effective responses.   
Relationship Defined 
Before approaching the relational perspective to crisis management, it is 
important to define the term “relationship.”  Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary defines 
relationship as “the state of being related or interrelated” or “the relation connecting or 
binding participants in a relationship” (Relationship, 2012).  Coombs (2012) defines 
relationships as the “interdependence of two or more peoples or groups” (p. 36).   
Coombs’ (2000) definition is a modification of O’Hair, Fridrich, Wiemann, and 
Wiemann’s (1995) definition that stated that relationships were the “interdependence of 
two or more people”  (p. 74).  The key to both definitions is the notion that groups and 
individuals are interdependent of one another and therefore linked to each other in some 
form or fashion. 
Relationship Management Theory in Public Relations 
 According to Ledingham (2006), the relational perspective has been applied to 
several public relations functions to include issues management, crisis management, 
media relations, and public affairs to name a few.  The relational perspective emerged 
from the work of Ferguson, in 1984, when it was suggested that a paradigm shift was 
needed that focused on relationships as the “unit of study” — and “not the organization, 
nor the public, nor the communication process” (Ledingham, 2006, p. 467).   Ferguson’s 
notion paved the way for the shift in how public relations was conceptualized, thus 
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establishing the idea of relationships between organizations and their stakeholders as an 
organizing concept for the relational perspective.  Ledingham echoed this sentiment and 
stated that, “The notion of relationship management represents a fundamental change in 
the function and direction of public relations, a movement away from traditional impact 
measurements, such as the quantity of communication messages produced or the number 
of stories placed in the mass media, and toward evaluation of public relations initiatives 
based on their impact on the quality of the relationship between the organization and the 
publics with which it interacts” (p. 466).   
 In 1994, Grunig, Grunig, and Ehling concluded that public relations contributes to 
overall organizational effectiveness when it helps to reconcile expectations between 
“strategic constituents” and organizational goals (Grunig, 2000).  According to Grunig, 
research of more than 300 organizations in the United States, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom revealed that public relations has value when good relationships were 
developed between the organization and its strategic publics.  Center and Jackson (1995) 
capture the essence of the relational perspective by observing that, “The proper term for 
the desired outcome of public relations practice is public relationships” (p. 2).  
Furthermore, Center and Jackson conclude that organizations achieve positive public 
relationships when they have effective public relations.  It is clear that the relational 
approach to public affairs is important; however, the key element to relationships is the 
impact it has on the organization’s stakeholders.  
Stakeholder Theory and Neo-institutionalism 
 According to Coombs (2006), one must discuss stakeholder theory and neo-
institutionalism in order to understand the role of relationships in crisis management.  
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One of the main tenants of stakeholder theory rests on the idea that corporations do not 
only affect stakeholders, but stakeholders also affect corporations (Elliot, 2010).  
Stakeholder management addresses how relationships between organizations and their 
stakeholders are managed, as well as explains how organizations interact with various 
groups within their environment (Carroll, 1989; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Coombs, 
2006).   
Neo-institutionalism, on the other hand, helps conceptualize how relationships 
develop between organizations and their stakeholders and where crises fit in the relational 
history.  Allen and Cailouet (1994), breaks down neo-institutionalism as the 
organization’s ability to meet the social rules and expectations of their stakeholders.  In 
short, neo-institutionalism focuses on an organization’s legitimacy and it’s right to 
continue operations.  
As previously mentioned, a crisis occurs when stakeholders perceive that one 
exists and important expectations are not being met (Coombs, 2012).  Because primary 
and secondary stakeholders are interdependent with organizations, and they can be bound 
together by social, economic, and political issues, it is important to talk about their 
relationships with organizations (Coombs, 2006).   
To review, Coombs (2012) defines stakeholders as “persons or groups that have 
interest, right, claim, or ownership in an organization” (p. 37).  According to Donaldson 
and Preston (1995), “all stakeholders have intrinsic value” (p. 67).  Coombs (2006) 
divided stakeholders into two distinct groups of primary and secondary stakeholders.  It is 
worth mentioning that organizations would likely cease to exist if they did not interact 
with their primary stakeholders.  Lastly, from a managerial perspective, stakeholder 
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management involves managing the relationship between an organization and its various 
stakeholders. 
According to Coombs (2006), neo-institutionalism helps us understand how 
stakeholder-organization relationships are managed.  One of the key elements to neo-
institutionalism is the concept of organizational legitimacy.  
According to Bedeain (1989), organizations are perceived to be legitimate by their 
stakeholders when they conform to certain social rules or expectations.  Allen and 
Caillouet (1994) state that organizations that are perceived to be legitimate by 
stakeholders have the right to continue operations.  On the contrary, organizations that 
lack legitimacy lose their right to continue operations.  Therefore, the stakeholder-
organization relationship history, or reputation, becomes dependent on the social rules 
and expectancies established by stakeholders (Coombs, 2006).  Lastly Coombs points out 
that crises can threaten or challenge an organization’s legitimacy, which can ultimately 
lead stakeholders to question whether an organization is meeting its social responsibilities 
and expectations.  From the research described in stakeholder theory and neo-
institutionalism, it is fair to state that relationship management is important to an 
organization’s success in avoiding or mitigating crisis.  However, what role do 
relationships play in organization-stakeholder relationship?  The next section will briefly 
explore this question from a corporate governance context. 
Corporate Governance Context to Crisis Management 
There is no disputing that relationships between organizations and stakeholders 
are important (Alpaslan, Green, and Mitroff, 2009).  From a corporate governance 
context, Pearson and Clair (1998) argue that the success of crisis preparation and 
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response is dependent on an organization’s established relationship with its stakeholders.  
Pearson and Clair also argue that organizational success is determined by the level of 
accuracy of an organization’s understanding of how their stakeholders will behave during 
a crisis.  Successful crisis management results when organizations build alliances, 
achieve coordination, and share information with their stakeholders.  Alliance building 
and information sharing is important to an organization’s success because stakeholders 
have “intrinsic value” and their perceptions can threaten an organization’s legitimacy.  
Part of the relationship building aspect to crisis management is ensuring that 
stakeholders get involved with organizations.  Nathan and Mitroff (1991) state that “the 
more efficient approach to crises requires the inclusion of as many stakeholders as 
possible during the crisis preparation and response stages, and allowing them to bring 
their perspective, identity, and knowledge to the analysis” (p. 164).  In order to 
successfully accomplish this level of stakeholder involvement, Alpaslan et al. (2009) 
argue that treatment between both parties must be “sincere” and the relationship should 
be based on mutual trust and cooperation.   
Because of globalization, the interdependent nature of relationships between 
organizations and stakeholders is on the rise (Alpaslan et al., 2009).  With increased 
interdependence comes the higher potential that organizations will be affected by a crisis 
(Alpaslan et al., 2009).  For this reason, Alpaslan et al. argue in favor of applying the 
stakeholder theory to crisis management.  
Conclusion 
After a thorough review of the scholarly literature, it is apparent that much 
research has been conducted in the fields of crisis communication, crisis management, 
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and relationship management.  By exploring crisis communication using Coombs’ (2012) 
three-stage approach to crisis management, crisis managers have a good prescription for 
how to prepare, handle, and recover from a crisis.  In reviewing the crisis management 
literature from a relational perspective, one can conclude that strong relationships 
between organizations and stakeholders play a crucial role in the outcomes of crises.   
Despite the depth and breadth of the scholarly literature, gaps do exist.  Much of 
the crisis communication research speaks to relationships between stakeholders and 
organizations from a reputation management perspective.  None of the literature found 
addresses how organizations can work together alongside primary and secondary 
stakeholders to get through a crisis.  Although some literature does address the 
importance of relationship building pre-crisis, the field in general is lacking.  
In a highly globalized world, where organizations are more interdependent, it will 
become more difficult to remain isolated when a crisis strikes.  A great example that 
illustrates this point is the recent grounding of the Costa Concordia in January 2012 
(CNN, 2012).  Although the cruise line was under fire as a result of the ship’s grounding, 
the entire cruise ship industry as well as the U.S. Coast Guard fielded questions regarding 
the safety of the cruise ship industry.  Because of the apparent lack in research on this 
topic, and increased globalization and interdependence of organizations, this topic should 
be scrutinized further.  Ultimately, this study will end up contributing to the extant crisis 
communication literature.  With this foundation laid, the following chapters will provide 
some background information and context for this case analysis as well as identify 
research questions to explore regarding the role of relationships during a crisis or disaster. 
  
 
CHAPTER III:  Background 
The American Red Cross was chosen for this study not only for its national and 
international reputation as a humanitarian organization, but also because of the 
accessibility and availability of key members, who were involved in the tornado 
response.  Furthermore, conducting a case analysis involving both a non-government 
organization such as the American Red Cross, and a government organization such as the 
City of Tuscaloosa, might provide some valuable insight in how two organizations such 
as these, through relationships, can leverage each other’s strengths and resources, 
especially during times of crisis. 
The American Red Cross 
Founded on May 21, 1881 by Clara Barton, the American Red Cross is one of the 
nation’s premier disaster relief organizations (“Our History,” n.d.).  Registered as a 
501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, this mostly volunteer agency responds to approximately 
70,000 natural and man-made disasters in the U.S. annually (“Disaster relief,” n.d.; 
“Donate funds,” n.d.).   
From its beginnings in the late 19th century, the Red Cross has conducted 
domestic and international disaster relief, aided the U.S. military during times of war by 
providing nurses, supplies, and blood, as well as conducted peacetime relief work.  Since 
then, the organization has expanded its services to areas such as civil defense, CPR/AED 
training, HIV/AIDS education, as well as providing emotional care and support in the 
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aftermath of disasters.  The Red Cross partnered with the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) in 2006 to help organizations and communities to plan and 
coordinate for disasters.  In addition to disaster preparation, FEMA and the Red Cross 
have worked together to provide feeding, sheltering, and family reunification services for 
communities affected by disasters.  Because the Red Cross has a history of interagency 
coordination, it will be a perfect organization to assess for this study. 
Today, volunteers and employees of the Red Cross carry out a variety of 
missions, and provide care and relief in five primary areas.  Primary Red Cross support 
areas include: 
1. People affected by disasters in America 
2. Support for members of the military and their families 
3. Blood collection, processing and distribution 
4. Health and safety education and training 
5. International relief and development 
Disaster Relief 
The Red Cross and its cadre of volunteers and employees respond to myriad 
natural and man-made disasters annually.  Disasters run the gamut from fires, hurricanes, 
earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods to hazardous material (HAZMAT) spills, 
transportation accidents, and explosions (“Disaster relief,” n.d.).  In the wake of a 
disaster, the Red Cross primarily focuses on the immediate emergency needs of 
individuals such as providing shelter, food, as well as health and emotional health 
services.  Assisting immediate needs of individuals and families affected by disaster is 
important because it helps people get on the path to resume their daily lives as soon as 
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possible.  In addition to addressing the immediate needs of individuals, the Red Cross 
also feeds first responders and emergency workers, such as fire fighters and police, 
provides blood and blood products to disaster victims, assists family members outside the 
disaster area with inquiries, and helps victims access additional available resources. 
City of Tuscaloosa 
 The City of Tuscaloosa is located in Tuscaloosa County along the banks of the 
Black Warrior River in west-central Alabama (“City of tuscaloosa,” n.d.).  Deriving its 
name from the Choctaw words “tushka” meaning warrior and “lusa” meaning black, the 
city was founded on December 1819 (“History of tuscaloosa,” n.d.).  Tuscaloosa is the 
state’s fifth most populous city, is the county seat for Tuscaloosa County, and home to 
more than 90,000 residents (“Encyclopedia of Alabama,” 2012).  As an education center, 
Tuscaloosa has three universities and colleges, the largest of which is the University of 
Alabama.  In addition to its educational infrastructure, Tuscaloosa’s industrial base is 
supported by the Mercedes-Benz international assembly plant, which employs 
approximately 4,000 employees.  
Tuscaloosa County Tornado History 
 Tuscaloosa County is no stranger to severe weather events.  According to the 
FEMA designated wind zones in the U.S., Tuscaloosa County is located in Zone IV (see 
figure 3), which is known not only for its frequency of tornadoes but also its deadly 
tornado history (“Tuscaloosa county hazard,” 2009).  For this reason, it is no surprise that 
Tuscaloosa ranked tornadoes as the second highest prioritized threat to the city, second 
only to thunderstorms and wind.  Despite the city’s familiarity with severe weather 
events, nothing could have prepared Tuscaloosa and its residents for what they 
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experienced on the afternoon of April 27, 2011.  A rare EF-4 tornado, considered to be 
one of the fiercest and most devastating tornadoes, because of its destructive force and 
what little it leaves behind in its aftermath. 
 
Figure 3:  FEMA Wind Zone Map 
Based on FEMA Wind Zones.  Information available at http://www.fema.gov/safe-
rooms/wind-zones-united-states 
 
 
Considered to be one of nature’s most-violent storms, tornadoes can spawn from 
powerful thunderstorms and cause complete devastation and destruction to cities, towns, 
and communities in a matter of minutes (“Tornado,” n.d.).  Appearing as rotating funnel 
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clouds that can reach winds in excess of 200 miles per hour, tornadoes often result in lost 
or damaged property, injuries, and fatalities, thus forever altering the lives of those 
individuals and communities that were affected by the storm’s aftermath.   
Tornado season in Alabama typically commences in March and ends in early 
June, with April and June being peak months for observed tornado activity (“Tuscaloosa 
county hazard,” 2009).  Observation of tornado data from January 1, 1997 to December 
31, 2006 revealed that Tuscaloosa County experienced 27 tornadoes, ranging from F0 to 
F5 on the Fujita Tornado Scale, and three funnel clouds, which resulted in twelve deaths, 
164 people injured and more than $19 million dollars in total damage.  Two of the 
twisters, including an F2 and an F1 tornado, directly affected the City of Tuscaloosa in 
1997 and 2003, respectively.  From 2007 to April 2011, Tuscaloosa County experienced 
nine more tornadoes ranging from F1 to F3 on the Fujita Tornado Scale ("Alabama 
tornado occurrences," 2013).   
Fujita Tornado Scale 
Prior to the adoption of the Fujita Scale, no formal method existed to differentiate 
one tornado from another (“A guide to,” 2003).  In an effort for standardization, the 
Fujita scale became the benchmark for estimating the intensity of tornadoes.  According 
to the National Weather Service, the “original” Fujita Scale, created by Dr. Ted Fujita of 
the University of Chicago in 1971, gave ratings of F0 to F5 based on the type and 
severity of damage that a tornado produced (“The enhanced fujita,” n.d.).  Due to a lack 
in ability to accurately measure tornado wind speeds, Fujita created approximate wind 
speed ranges for each damage category by estimating through “after-the-fact examination 
of damage” that each tornado produced.  After 2007, the National Weather Service 
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adopted the Enhanced Fujita Scale (EF-Scale) to rate tornadoes (see Figure 4).  Created 
by a group of engineers, meteorologists, and experts at the Wind Science and 
Engineering Research Center at Texas Tech University, the EF Scale has revised wind 
speed ranges and is used today to categorize tornadoes. 
Figure 4: Enhanced Fujita Scale 
Based on the Enhanced Fujita Tornado Intensity Scale, 2013. 
Information available at http://www.weather.com/safety/tornadoes/enhanced-fujita-
tornado-scale-20120330. 
 
EF Scale Wind Speed 
EF 0 65-85 mph 
EF 1 86-110 mph 
EF 2 111-135 mph 
EF 3 136-165 mph 
EF 4 166-200 mph 
EF 5 Over 200 mph 
 
Disaster Management 
When analyzing any crisis or disaster, it is important to review the emergency 
management structures of the organizations involved.  Understanding organizational 
structures will help shed light on how agencies and organizations respond during an 
emergency or disaster.   
The City of Tuscaloosa utilized the Incident Command System structure during 
their response to the tornado.  Developed in the 1970s, following a series of catastrophic 
fires in California, ICS is a standardized management system that is used at all levels of 
government, and also has been employed by nongovernment organizations and the 
private sector to address any potential hazard or emergency that might arise (“Incident 
command system,” n.d.).  Used as a management tool to respond to natural hazards, 
technical hazards, human-caused hazards, and planned events, ICS provides an integrated 
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management structure, which enables managers to seamlessly coordinate an emergency 
response across multiple jurisdictions, and functional agencies.  Due to its flexible nature, 
ICS can also be integrated to match the complexities and demands of any incident, 
regardless of size or scope.   
Every incident requires management functions to be performed (“Incident 
commander and,” 2010).  When a disaster strikes and ICS is initiated, management 
functions are performed by a cadre of individuals, which include, Incident Command, 
Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance and Administration (See Figure 5).   
Figure 5: Incident Command Structure 
Based on IS-100.b – Introduction to the Incident Command System (ICS) 
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The Incident Commander, who is overall responsible for managing the incident, sets 
objectives, and develops strategies on how to handle incidents.  As incidents grow in size 
and scope, the Incident Commander may delegate his or her authority for certain 
responsibilities to either the Command Staff or the General Staff.  A brief description of 
other key management function descriptions can be found in Figure 6.   
Figure 6: Incident Command Management Function Descriptions 
Based on IS-100.b – Incident Commander and Command Staff Functions 
  
Although it is well practiced in emergency management and ICS, the Red Cross 
does not utilize the ICS structure during every response (S. Horsley, personal 
communication, November 30, 2012).  Instead, the Red Cross uses its own internal 
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organizational structure to respond to emergencies and disasters, although it closely 
mirrors the ICS system (See Figure 7).  One reason for the different structure is that the 
Red Cross maintains a certain level of autonomy when responding to various crises.  
Autonomy allows for a faster organizational response, as well as faster access and 
delivery of resources if required.  Despite some of its differences, the Red Cross 
organizational structure is in many ways similar to ICS, with many of its positions 
fulfilling parallel functions.  For example, the Incident Commander is the title for the 
person who manages and runs the operation in an ICS structure.  However, during a Red 
Cross response, management responsibilities are given to the Job Director.  Despite 
having different organizational structures and nomenclature, individuals from both 
organizations are trained in ICS, which allows responders to have a common knowledge 
and understanding when it comes to emergency management.  Now that a thorough 
background regarding the Red Cross and the City has been conducted, the next section 
will be dedicated to the research questions and methods used for this analysis.   
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Figure 7: Sample Red Cross Organizational Chart for Disasters 
Based on Red Cross Toledo Chapter Organizational Chart (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
  
 
CHAPTER IV: Research Questions & Method 
This study aims to answer the following two research questions: 
        RQ1:  What relationship did the City of Tuscaloosa have with the American Red 
Cross prior to April 27, 2011? 
        RQ2:  How did the relationship between the City of Tuscaloosa and the American 
Red Cross affect their ability to conduct crisis communication and disaster response? 
Case Study Method 
According to Wimmer and Dominick (2006), the case study approach to research 
allows the researcher to garner “as many data sources as possible to systematically 
investigate individuals, groups, organizations, or events” (p. 137).  According to Yin 
(2009), case study research can be used in many different situations to “contribute to the 
overall knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social, political, and related 
phenomena” (p. 4).  Yin also argues that case study methodology allows investigators to 
“retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events — such as individual 
cycles, small group behavior, organizational and managerial processes, neighborhood 
change, school performance, international relations, and the maturation of industries” (p. 
4). 
Interviews 
The long form interview is considered to be one of the most powerful methods 
used in qualitative research (McCracken, 1988).  Long form interviews not only reveal to 
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the investigator the mental world of an individual, they also offer an opportunity for 
researchers to experience the world through the eyes and mind of another person.  
Furthermore, long form interviews also take investigators “into the lifeworld of the 
individual, to see content and pattern of daily experience” (p. 9).  
Communications Audit 
According to Hargie and Tourish (2000), a communications audit can help gauge 
the success or failure of a campaign or process because it gleans information from 
multiple sources of information.  Coffman (2004) states that strategic communications 
audits are “systemic assessments, either formal or informal, of an organization’s capacity 
for, or performance of essential communications practices” (p. 2).  Communications 
audits are also evaluative and help organizations determine what works and what doesn’t 
work with regards to their communication efforts.  Lastly, communication audits help 
illuminate areas where organizations could strengthen their performance. 
Method 
This study used a mixed-method approach to answer the aforementioned research 
questions, specifically, Wimmer and Dominick’s (2006) critical incident technique.  
According to Wimmer and Dominick, “The critical incident technique is a combination 
of in-depth interviewing and the case study approach.  Its chief value is that it allows the 
researcher to gather in-depth information about a defined significant incident from the 
perspectives of those who were involved in it” (p. 406).  An advantage to the critical 
incident technique is that it provides a picture of a significant event through the eyes of 
those who were directly involved.  However, the information provided is only as reliable 
as the memories of those who experienced the incident.  For this reason, multiple data 
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sources were considered as part of this case analysis to enable a deeper examination of 
the relationship and interagency coordination between the City of Tuscaloosa and the 
American Red Cross.  Primary and secondary data sources included qualitative semi-
structured interviews with members of the City of Tuscaloosa and the American Red 
Cross, a review of the City’s Crisis Action Plan, the Tuscaloosa County Hazard 
Mitigation Plan, organizational websites and documents, and any relevant news articles 
and documents from the National Weather Service, the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, and FEMA (see Appendix A). 
Using Coombs’ (2012) three-stage approach as the crisis management model to 
examine the actions of both organizations during the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis 
phases, qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with key response 
personnel.  In addition to semi-structured interviews, a communications audit was 
conducted on the City of Tuscaloosa’s Crisis Action Plan.  The American Red Cross did 
not provide a Crisis Action Plan or a Crisis Communications Plan.  Neither the city nor 
the American Red Cross provided any other communications materials relevant to this 
case study.  Both qualitative methods helped to answer the research questions in order to 
shed light on the nature of the relationship between the City of Tuscaloosa and the 
American Red Cross.  
Six semi-structured interviews were conducted with key members from the City 
of Tuscaloosa and the American Red Cross.  All six participants played an active, 
contributing role with their respective organizations during the tornado response on April 
27.  Participants were initially recruited via email to invite them to participate in the 
research.  Follow-up phone calls were made to each individual for introduction purposes 
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and rapport building.  All participants were given written consent forms that were signed 
and returned to me prior to commencement of the interviews.   
Primary interviews were conducted over a three-week period and set up at times 
convenient to all parties.  Interviews varied in length anywhere from 20 minutes to two 
hours in duration, with the majority lasting about an hour.  Interviews were conducted 
with the Mayor of Tuscaloosa, the Incident Commander for the City of Tuscaloosa, the 
Public Relations Coordinator for the City of Tuscaloosa, a Public Information Officer 
(PIO) for the American Red Cross, Regional Communications Officer for the American 
Red Cross, and the Executive Director of the West Alabama Chapter of the American 
Red Cross.  Follow-up interviews were conducted with participants when additional 
information was required for the research.  Follow-up interviews were conducted via 
phone call.  Out of respect to some of the more sensitive comments regarding the 
response, some of participant’s quotes will remain confidential.  The only identifiable 
information will be the agency that they are from. 
Participants were deliberately selected not only for their experience and expertise 
during the tornado response, but also due to their varying degrees in level of 
responsibility.  For example, the City of Tuscaloosa’s Public Relations Coordinator 
would have similar tactical responsibilities and duties as the PIO for the American Red 
Cross.  Additionally, the Mayor of Tuscaloosa would have similar strategic 
responsibilities and duties as the Executive Director of the West Alabama Chapter of the 
American Red Cross.  All interviews were conducted via phone and digitally recorded 
using appropriate phone recording software.  All content from the interviews were 
transcribed verbatim for qualitative analysis.   
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In order to answer the research questions, indicators were identified after the 
interviews were conducted to help ascertain both the nature of the relationship (did it 
exist or not), as well as relationship strength.  Additionally, indicators were identified to 
determine how the relationship between the city and the Red Cross affected crisis 
communication and disaster response efforts during the storm.     
In order to answer RQ1, interview questions focused solely on the pre-crisis phase 
of the disaster.  The pre-crisis phase included any inter-organizational actions taken 
between the city and the Red Cross before the tornado struck on the afternoon of April 
27.  If interview participants mentioned any actions that involved inter-organizational 
disaster planning, preparations, or training, then these might be good indicators that a 
relationship existed prior to the storm.  Other indicators might include any evidence of 
formal agreements between the two organizations, such as memoranda of agreement 
(MOAs) or memoranda of understanding (MOUs).  Lastly, any internal documents such 
as crisis communications plans or crisis action plans that specifically identify each 
organization can also be a good indicator of a pre-existing relationship between the Red 
Cross and the city.   
In order to determine the strength of the relationship during the pre-crisis phase, 
interview participants were asked questions that focused on how well they knew their 
counterparts at the other agency.  Additionally, questions were asked regarding frequency 
of interaction.  For example, how often did they interact or communicate with members 
of the other organization?  If participants knew people by name and or communicated 
frequently with members of the organization, then these answers are good indications that 
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the relationship was strong.  If participants had little to no interaction with the other 
organization, then this would be a good indicator that the relationship was weak. 
In order to answer RQ2, interview questions focused on the crisis and post-crisis 
phases of the storm.  The crisis and post-crisis phases included any inter-organizational 
actions taken between the city and the Red Cross from the moment the tornado struck 
until the time when both organizations returned to normal operations.  The city and the 
Red Cross entered the post-crisis phase at different times, which were determined by their 
respective policies and procedures.  Regardless of when the post-crisis phase began for 
each organization, questions during the crisis and post-crisis phases remained focused on 
interagency coordination and interaction.  For example, if Red Cross and city personnel 
communicated and coordinated frequently during the response, then this might be a good 
indication that the impact was positive on their crisis communication and disaster 
response efforts.  Other indicators might include whether or not messages and press 
releases were drafted jointly.  If there was little coordination or there were indications of 
confusion or conflict between the two organizations, then this might reveal that the 
relationship negatively affected their performance.  Lastly, if the Red Cross and the city 
came together in the post-crisis phase to share lessons and develop best practices for 
future storms, then this would be a good indication that the relationship had a positive 
impact. 
Interview questions were divided into three sections, using Coombs’ three-stage 
crisis management model, which included the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis phases.  
Questions that were asked in the pre-crisis phase were designed to ascertain the nature 
and strength of the relationship between the City of Tuscaloosa and the American Red 
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Cross prior to the tornado on April 27, 2011.  Examples of questions asked during the 
pre-crisis included: 
1. What relationship (formal/informal) existed between the City of Tuscaloosa 
and the American Red Cross prior to April 27, 2011? 
2. If a relationship existed, was the relationship formal or informal?  For 
example, did formal memorandums of understanding (MOUs) or 
memorandums of agreement exist in writing between the two organizations? 
3. If a formal/informal relationship existed, how frequently did you interact or 
communicate with each other prior to April 26, 2011? 
4. What type of interaction took place between the City of Tuscaloosa and the 
American Red Cross prior to April 27, 2011 (email/phone correspondence, 
meetings, exercises etc.)? 
Questions that were asked during the crisis phase were designed to ascertain the level of 
coordination and cooperation during the tornado response.  Examples of questions during 
the crisis phase included: 
1. Did you use an Incident Command Center (ICC) or Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC) during the response? 
2. Was the City/American Red Cross represented in the EOC/ICC? 
3. Was a Joint Information Center (JIC) established? 
4. Did the City of Tuscaloosa/American Red Cross have representatives in the 
JIC? 
5. Did you ever conduct joint press conference with the American Red 
Cross/City of Tuscaloosa? 
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Questions that were asked during the post-crisis phase were designed to ascertain the 
level of coordination and cooperation during the post-crisis phase.  Examples of 
questions during the post-crisis phase included: 
1. What were some important lessons learned from the crisis response? 
2. What things could you improve on in a future crisis? 
3. What is the most important take away for future crises regarding your 
relationship with the City of Tuscaloosa/American Red Cross? 
4. Has your relationship strengthened from this experience? 
5. How do you think it will help you during the next crisis? 
For the complete interview guide, please see Appendix C. 
Limitations 
 No matter how simple or complex a study can be all research seems to be 
constrained by time and resources.  Therefore, limitations are unavoidable fact of life for 
researchers.  Despite the valuable information and lessons provided from this study, 
limitations do exist.  Addressing these limitations in future studies will only make this 
research more rich and fruitful for others to use.   
One limitation from this study involves the timing of the research.  Because the 
tornado affected Tuscaloosa almost two years ago, interview participants had to rely on 
memory to recall information from the response.  Additionally, some participants no 
longer work with the city or are in new positions with other organizations, making it 
difficult to assess the nature of the relationship between the two organizations following 
the crisis.  Obviously, the opportune time to conduct interviews would have been 
immediately following the storm, while the information was fresh in everyone’s minds 
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and participants still worked at their respective organizations.   
This study is also limited because it only observes the relationship between the 
City of Tuscaloosa, the American Red Cross, and the participants involved in those 
organizations.  It would have been useful to interview response personnel from other 
organizations who were familiar with the Red Cross and city officials.  These individuals 
might have been able to shed an outside observer’s perspective on the relationship 
between the two organizations.   
To make this a more comprehensive study regarding inter-organizational 
relationships, it would have been useful to examine the relationships between the City of 
Tuscaloosa with other NGOs and nonprofits such as the Salvation Army, and other 
religious organizations that all were involved in the response.  Additionally, it would 
have been useful to see how the city, local NGOs, and nonprofits coordinated with county 
and state officials during the response.   
In 2009, officials from both the Red Cross and the City of Tuscaloosa participated 
in a full-scale exercise at FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute in Emmitsburg, 
Maryland.  Observing participants in any exercise can be useful, when attempting to 
ascertain the nature of the relationship prior to the crisis event.  Lastly, it would have 
been useful to get access to key internal documents of both organizations in order to get a 
better picture of their relationships prior to April 27, 2011.  
A rare EF-4 tornado devastated the City of Tuscaloosa and its citizens on April 
27, 2011.  Because the city and the Red Cross were both greatly affected by the tornado, 
and members from both organizations played key roles during the response and recovery 
phases of the crisis, this event provides a perfect case to analyze and provide lessons 
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learned for organizations that are preparing for future potential disasters.  The following 
sections of this case study will provide a review of the results, as well as provide 
recommendations for future first responders and organizations as they prepare for 
potential disasters and crises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER V:  Tuscaloosa Tornado 
A thorough narrative describing the events and crisis management actions 
involving the City of Tuscaloosa and the Red Cross throughout the crisis is one method 
to facilitate analysis for this case study.  The following narrative will provide an 
overview of the crisis using the aforementioned three-stage model of crisis management 
as proposed by Coombs (2012), as well as provide detailed results from the qualitative 
interviews, written in narrative form.  
 Before I discuss the events leading up to the tornado, it is important to observe 
how interview participants defined the characteristics that constitute a good relationship. 
When interview participants were asked how they would define a strong relationship, 
most individuals mentioned similar themes.  Some of the common themes included the 
importance of having strong personal relationships.  Additionally, interview participants 
stated the importance of having a mutual understanding of each other’s capabilities and 
limitations.  Lastly, organizations should understand each other’s roles and 
responsibilities.  A full description of common themes can be found in Figure 8.   
When asked whether informal or formal relationships or agreements were more 
important, most participants agreed that both were important; however, they were more 
inclined to prefer the informal relationships in lieu of the formal relationships.  
Participants stated that formal agreements are legally binding to both organizations, thus 
making them beneficial.  However, the majority of participants believed that the informal 
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relationships or agreements were more important, because they involved personal 
relationships and human interaction.  Chris Osborne, the Regional Communication’s 
Officer for the Red Cross, detailed the advantages of both formal and informal 
agreements: 
 You know, obviously formal agreements are binding in a lot of cases and you can 
 see it on paper.  So, people don’t have the opportunity to forget any promises that 
were made.  So, I would always encourage formal agreements.  But the informal  
agreements mean in a lot of cases that you have built those relationships, which  
are often times built through communication, built through face-to-face meetings  
and rapport building.  (C. Osborne, personal communication, December 4, 2012) 
Oscar Barnes, who was the Executive Director of the West Alabama Chapter of 
the Red Cross, detailed his opinion regarding the importance of formal and informal 
agreements: 
Formal agreements are just a piece of paper.  Informal agreements are when you  
get together collectively and do the things you need to do because of the need to  
provide a service to your community.  So you do whatever you can to strengthen  
it [agreement].  Formal [agreements] just makes it kind of official.  It’s something  
we ought to do all the time. (O. Barnes, personal communication, December 19, 
2012) 
 
After a brief review of the results regarding traits of strong relationships according to 
interview participants, I will move forward with the case analysis framing the disaster 
using Coombs’ (2012) three-stage approach to crisis management. 
Figure 8: Common themes that define a strong relationship 
Based on responses of interview participants 
 
Having a strong personal relationship Having someone’s name 
Knowing what each party has to offer Face to face interaction 
Strong lines of communication between 
organizations 
Knowing people on a first name basis 
Strong connection with the other 
organization 
Trust 
Having a phone number of someone from 
the other organization 
Having knowledge of how to get in contact 
with someone from the other organization 
Having a strong personal relationship Having a good relationship at multiple 
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levels of the chain of command 
Knowing each other’s capabilities and 
limitations 
Sharing resources 
Understanding roles and responsibilities Having a strong informal relationship 
 
Pre-crisis Phase 
Knowing when and where a natural disaster will strike can often be difficult to 
predict.  However, having little to no warning doesn’t mean that organizations are 
helpless when it comes to these events.  Careful foresight, planning, preparation, training, 
and coordination are some actions that organizations can take in advance in order to 
prepare for a natural disaster.  Furthermore, lessons learned from each experience can be 
valuable when helping organizations plan and prepare for the next disaster.  
ICS Training and Emergency Management  
The City of Tuscaloosa experienced its fair share of severe weather events prior to 
April 27, 2011, some of which included tornadoes and other natural disasters 
(“Tuscaloosa county hazard,” 2009).  In order to be better prepared to handle emergency 
situations, Tuscaloosa’s Mayor, Walter Maddox, identified a need in 2009, for city 
officials as well as other organizations in the community to be trained in emergency 
management, specifically ICS (R. Edgeworth, personal communication, November 30, 
2012).  Tuscaloosa’s fire chief, who having already completed training and incorporated 
the ICS structure within his own organization, strongly encouraged the mayor and his 
staff to send city representatives and other organizations within the community to attend 
as well.  According to Edgeworth, having a common management structure and doctrine 
in place would only help facilitate city managers and first responders as they respond to 
future emergencies or crises.  Additionally, the ICS structure is what FEMA and state 
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EMA would likely use during a disaster, so it made sense to receive the same training and 
institute a similar disaster management system.   
Heeding the fire chief’s advice, the City of Tuscaloosa sent 60 representatives to 
FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute, located in Emmitsburg, Maryland, to receive 
community specific incident management training (W. Maddox, personal 
communication, November 26, 2012).  The purpose of the training was to not only 
educate city officials on ICS and emergency management, but also assist Tuscaloosa 
response personnel and city managers on how to prepare for and respond to a potential 
crisis or emergency in the future.  When describing the value of exercises and training, 
Mayor Maddox detailed: 
They [exercises] establish protocols.  They [exercises] give you an awareness 
of the issues that you are going to typically face, in our case during a tornado. 
ICS gave us a global perspective of what was happening in our city.  We can set  
goals and objectives and move forward to the next problem in a fairly quick  
manner.  ICS also allows us to operate more efficiently. (W. Maddox, personal  
communication, November 26, 2012) 
  
Training participants included the mayor, members of the mayor’s staff, and individuals 
representing a dozen other community organizations and first responders, such as local 
law enforcement, fire departments, and county emergency management.  In addition to 
local city and county personnel, representatives from the Red Cross also attended the 
training (R. Edgeworth, personal communication, February, 1, 2013).   
The weeklong training session consisted of classroom lectures, which ultimately 
culminated in a full-scale exercise involving multiple crisis scenarios (R. Edgeworth, 
personal communication, December 3, 2012).  To ensure as much realism as possible for 
the trainees, FEMA made sure that the training was tailored specific for the city of 
Tuscaloosa.  FEMA studied the city and created scenarios based on incidents that would 
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most likely occur in Tuscaloosa and its surrounding areas.  Examples of crisis scenarios 
specific to Tuscaloosa included a train derailment, a water line break, a bus accident, a 
building fire, and a university riot.  FEMA also provided simulated local news feeds 
specific to the City of Tuscaloosa to add to the realism of the scenario.   
During the time of the training exercise, City officials did not realize that the 
lessons learned at Emmitsburg would be put to the test on the afternoon of April 27, 
2011.  Robin Edgeworth, who served as the City’s Incident Commander during the storm, 
provided some interesting hindsight.  She detailed: 
We were very fortunate in that the Mayor, a couple of years ago, had seen a need 
for training.  So that [the training] had us well prepared.  I remember that they 
[ICS instructors] were talking about debris removal and how several of us made 
jokes, like do we really need to listen to this?  Why would we need to know how 
many cubic yards of debris needed to be moved and things like that?  As it was 
over, they [ICS instructors] were laughing, telling us that the bad part about going 
there [Emergency Management Institute] is that every group that attends the 
program ends up having a disaster within a few years.  I guess we proved them 
right. (R. Edgeworth, personal communication, December 3, 2012) 
 
As previously mentioned, the Red Cross responds to a number of incidents 
annually, and it members are intimately familiar in emergency management and ICS 
procedures.  However, when responding to disasters or emergencies, the Red Cross 
typically uses its own internal management structure (S. Horsley, personal 
communication, November 30, 2012).  In an effort to ensure its personnel are prepared to 
work in a joint environment during a disaster, Red Cross personnel continually receive 
ICS training.  
In 2009, the Red Cross sent two of its members to Emmitsburg, Maryland to 
attend the same community specific incident management training as the city (O. Barnes, 
personal communication, December 19, 2012).  Despite the fact that the training was 
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useful and relevant to most attendees, Red Cross participants felt more could have been 
done.  According to one individual who attended the training, the Red Cross played a 
minimal role during the full-scale exercise.  For example, one of the primary 
responsibilities of the Red Cross following a disaster is to set up shelter for individuals 
who have lost their homes.  Instead of going through the actual process of establishing a 
shelter, which includes interagency coordination and logistical planning, the scenario 
only required Red Cross personnel to simulate the process.  The following insight was 
provided by one of the training participants: 
Well, we did go to Emmitsburg, Maryland, and did a town drill.  There were  
about 70 or 80 of us that went up there [Emmitsburg].  It was kind  
of like they [the city] did their thing and we [Red Cross] were present.  We were a  
minor part of the sheltering operation and that is not all that the Red Cross does.   
And I don’t think the whole group [exercise participants] knew all of the roles we  
play.  We sat in the EOC and answered phone calls about where the shelter, but it  
was still a minor role when it came down to it.  We weren’t involved at the level  
that it would have improved our ability to interact a lot. (Red Cross  
representative, personal communication, December 2012) 
 
The training received at Emmitsburg would be the last formal large-scale exercise 
and training evolution that the city would participate in before April 27, 2011 (R. 
Edgeworth, personal communication, December, 3, 2012).  This training would also be 
the last coordinated exercise and training event conducted between the city and the Red 
Cross before the tornado struck.  According to Edgeworth, there were no federal or state 
mandates in place that required the City of Tuscaloosa to conduct any formal exercises or 
training events.  Although the city and the Red Cross did not participate in any 
coordinated exercises between the two agencies, each organization was able to conduct 
some training prior to April 27, 2011.   
Despite an absence of mandates, the city still managed to put its ICS training to 
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good use.  In addition to requiring city employees to receive ICS qualifications at various 
levels, Mayor Maddox utilized the ICS structure as much as possible during routine city 
events, such as Alabama home football games (R. Edgeworth, personal communication, 
December, 3, 2012).  Because the city was still relatively new at using ICS, putting it to 
practice during routine evolutions was a good method to help personnel better understand 
the response process as well as improve their capability to respond to a potential 
emergency.  During the times that ICS was initiated, the city neither involved nor 
required interagency coordination or assistance. 
 Like the city, the Red Cross also continued to train and prepare for potential 
disasters (O. Barnes, personal communication, December 19, 2012).  Because of its 
established relationships with the local fire and police departments, the Red Cross 
worked closely with them to respond to emergencies such as single-family home and 
apartment fires.  In addition to its partnerships with local fire and police departments, the 
Red Cross had a long-standing relationship with the Tuscaloosa County Emergency 
Management Agency (EMA) (W. Maddox, personal communication, November 26, 
2012).  According to Chris Osborne, who was the Regional Communications Officer for 
the Red Cross, this relationship not only involved participation in joint exercises, but it 
also involved mutual agreements between the county and the Red Cross regarding 
sheltering operations (C. Osborne, personal communication, December 4, 2012).  He 
detailed: 
I can’t really speak to a specific relationship because obviously there was an 
executive director in place.  From a 30,000 foot level, I can tell you we worked 
very closely with not only the city government, but county municipalities, 
emergency management associations or agencies, I should  
say EMAs.  Certainly we have agreements in place for sheltering and things like  
that.  It [agreements] has to be done in non-disaster times, way ahead of time.   
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Those are formal agreements.  They are signed documents that say hey, you are  
going to allow the Red Cross into your facility for X amount of time to shelter  
people that have been affected by emergencies. (C. Osborne, personal  
communication, December 4, 2012) 
Disaster Planning and Interagency Coordination 
When it came to disaster planning and preparation, there was little evidence to 
suggest from interview participants that the city and the Red Cross worked together prior 
to April 27, 2011.  In fact, there was little evidence to suggest that Red Cross and city 
officials interacted much with each other prior to the tornado.  When asked about the 
nature of the relationship between the city and the Red Cross prior to April 27, 2011, one 
city official replied that they were aware of the Red Cross’ presence in the city, but they 
never interacted with them.  Additionally, this individual did not personally interact with 
the Red Cross prior to April 27.  This individual detailed: 
For the city of Tuscaloosa, I guess, I can’t really say that we had a  
relationship other than knowing that they [Red Cross] were always there and were  
always apart of our community.  But for our county EMA, the Red Cross always  
played a role when the county EMA established their structure.  So I think it’s  
been a long time relationship as far as how they [Red Cross and EMA] responded  
in disasters, but as far as the City of Tuscaloosa itself, they [Red Cross] are not,  
which would not be that unusual.  They [Red Cross] are a partner to our county,  
as opposed to a partner to our city.  (Personal communication, December 2012) 
Meredith Lynch, who was a graduate student at the University of Alabama and an 
intern with the Mayor’s office, filled the position of public relations coordinator for the 
City of Tuscaloosa after the storm on April 27, 2012 (M. Lynch, personal 
communication, December 13, 2012).  Prior to her arrival, the city did not have an actual 
public relations coordinator or PIO.  According to Lynch, she had no interaction with the 
Red Cross prior to April 27, while she filled the position of public relations coordinator. 
When members of the Red Cross were asked the same question, they responded in 
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a similar fashion to city officials regarding their relationship prior to April 27, 2011.  Dr. 
Suzanne Horsley, who was the Red Cross PIO during the tornado response, also had no 
interaction with her counterpart at the city, mainly because the city did not have an actual 
person filling the PIO position until Lynch’s arrival (S. Horsley, personal 
communication, November 30, 2012).  Horsley was also new to Tuscaloosa and busy 
teaching at the University of Alabama, which occupied most of her time.  When asked if 
members of the city were familiar with the Red Cross’ missions prior to April 27, one 
Red Cross member detailed: 
Maybe the higher ups know that the Red Cross is available.  Maybe a few of the  
other departments know that the Red Cross is available.  I think they [city  
officials] generally know what we do, but they don’t know all the different  
aspects of what we do.  I think if there is any lesson learned out of this, they’ve  
[City of Tuscaloosa] got to know what the Red Cross can do and can’t do.  
(personal communication, December 2012) 
Despite such little interaction between the two agencies prior to April 27, there 
was some evidence to suggest that a relationship existed between the city and the Red 
Cross among some senior level officials.  According to Mayor Maddox, a personal 
relationship had existed between him and Oscar Barnes for several years (W. Maddox, 
personal communication, November 26, 2012).  Mayor Maddox detailed: 
I had a personal relationship with Oscar Barnes, who was the American Red  
Cross Executive Director at the time.  Oscar reached out to me when he arrived  
here.  I can’t give the exact date.  I knew from our disaster management training  
the role the Red Cross would play in terms of sheltering.  I understood their role,  
but I think the personal understanding was with Oscar’s arrival.  (W. Maddox,  
personal communication, November 26, 2012) 
Chris Osborne echoed similar sentiments regarding the relationships between the Red 
Cross and the city.  He detailed: 
 They [the city] know how to contact us and we know how to contact them.  If  
there is a need that we can supply, they [the city] don’t hesitate to pick up the 
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phone or shoot us an email or however those communications avenues are in 
place (C. Osborne, personal communication, December 4, 2012). 
 
Despite the apparent lack of established interagency coordination between the 
City of Tuscaloosa and the Red Cross, relationships did exist with other organizations.  
The Executive Director of the West Alabama Chapter, Oscar Barnes, served as the chair 
of the Alabama Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (AL VOAD).  AL VOAD is a 
network of nonprofit and faith-based organizations that was established to work together 
in an effort to reduce the effects of disasters (“About Alabama VOAD,” n.d.).  According 
to Barnes, members of AL VOAD got together and met periodically to discuss different 
disasters scenarios.  Specifically, the group discussed the allocation of resources during 
disaster response.  Barnes detailed: 
It’s [AL VOAD] different agencies that bring different resources to the table to  
help out in situations like this [tornado aftermath].  The Salvation Army, Catholic  
Social Services, and Senior Citizens Group were some of our members.  All those  
that came together would say that they have certain resources available if there  
was a disaster.  Then we would talk amongst ourselves and build relationships.   
And when the time comes, we know what each other can provide and be able to  
help out and respond. (O. Barnes, personal communication, December 19, 2012). 
 
According to Barnes, the city did not have a representative that participated in AL VOAD 
prior to the storm. 
 Like the Red Cross, the City of Tuscaloosa also established relationships 
involving other organizations (R. Edgeworth, personal communication, December 3, 
2012).  According to Edgeworth, mutual aid agreements were in place between the city 
and other municipalities prior to April 27.  Mutual aid agreements were in place to assist 
Tuscaloosa if additional resources, such as fire fighters and law enforcement, were 
needed during the aftermath of a disaster.  In addition to mutual aid agreements, Mayor 
Maddox had established strong personal relationships with neighboring mayors in 
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Alabama as well as with the governor (W. Maddox, personal communication, November 
26, 2012).  Despite having established relationships with other organizations, the city’s 
disaster planning and preparation was mainly internalized and did not include outside 
agencies such as the Red Cross (R. Edgeworth, personal communication, December 3, 
2012). 
Crisis Action Plan 
 It is important for any organization to have a crisis management plan (CMP) or 
crisis action plan (CAP).  A CMP or CAP should contain information needed to manage a 
crisis (Coombs, 2012).  According to members of the Red Cross and the city of 
Tuscaloosa, both organizations possessed a CAP or CMP.  However, the city was the 
only organization that provided their CAP for review. 
 After conducting a communications audit of the city’s CAP, it was evident that 
the mayor, his staff, and his various departments had a well-thought-out plan to handle a 
disaster or emergency.  The city’s CAP provided guidelines for how the city would 
coordinate and respond during a disaster or large-scale event (“City of Tuscaloosa,” 
2008).  The CAP also outlined specific instructions and information regarding when to 
stand up city’s Crisis Management Center (CMC) and EOC, and where they would be 
located.  Lastly, the CAP outlined the city’s unified command structure to include the 
various roles and responsibilities that people would hold during the response.  It is noted 
that city personnel referred to the CMC as the Incident Command Center (ICC) when 
responding to interview questions regarding their command center. 
 According to the CAP, the Mayor would not act in the capacity of a traditional 
Incident Commander during a disaster or emergency (“City of Tuscaloosa,” 2008).  
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Instead, the Mayor would delegate this responsibility to Robin Edgeworth, the city’s 
Legal Affairs Administrator, while he oversaw the Policy Group (see Appendix B for 
CMC Unified Command Structure).  The responsibility of Incident Commander was 
delegated to Robin so the Mayor could oversee the response and handle any policy issues 
that came up.  The Incident Commander’s responsibility during a response would be to 
manage the incident or the emergency (R. Edgeworth, personal communication, 
December 3, 2012).  However, according to the CAP, the mayor or a designee would act 
as the lead spokesperson for the city. 
 According to the CAP, the city would have a Liaison Officer, who was 
responsible for working and coordinating with any outside agencies associated with the 
event (“City of Tuscaloosa,” 2008).  Specifically, the CAP mentions that the Liaison 
Officer “coordinates with Tuscaloosa County EOC for assistance needed from agencies 
such as Red Cross, Salvation Army, the Coroner’s Office, Alabama Power Company, 
ALGASCO, etc.” (p. 9).  Furthermore, the Liaison Officer was responsible for providing 
a point of contact for assisting mutual aid agencies, identifying and communicating with 
all agency representatives, and providing information to agencies and key crisis 
management positions.  When asked if the city had a Liaison Officer prior to and during 
the storm on April 27, 2011, Edgeworth stated that they did not have an individual who 
filled this role (R. Edgeworth, personal communication, December 3, 2012). 
Full Dress Rehearsal 
 As previously mentioned, April and June are typically the peak months for 
observed tornado activity in Alabama (“Tuscaloosa county hazard,” 2009).  April 2011 
proved to be an extremely active month for storm activity as evidenced by the 108 
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tornado occurrences that were recorded throughout the state of Alabama (“Alabama 
tornado data,” 2012).  On April 15, 2011, a storm system that had already caused 
devastation across the eastern half of the U.S., spawned a tornado outbreak that affected 
central Alabama (“Tornado outbreak of,” 2012).  On that day, an EF-3 tornado touched 
down southwest of Tuscaloosa, in Greene County, and continued on a northeasterly path 
before it lifted near the city (“Black warrior green,” 2011).  Although the tornado did not 
result in any injuries or fatalities for Tuscaloosa and Greene County residents, it did leave 
an 18-mile path of uprooted trees, damaged homes and businesses, and caused 
widespread power outages and flooding.    
At the time of the storm, city officials believed that this incident was going to be 
the weather event of the Mayor’s time in office (W. Maddox, personal communication, 
November 26, 2012).  What they did not realize is that the storm would be a dress 
rehearsal for April 27, 2011.  Mayor Maddox detailed: 
 The April 15th storm produced an EF-3 tornado that damaged and destroyed 
    around 100 homes.  It created around 30,000 cubic yards of debris.  This storm 
created a lot of flooding and tree damage around the city, which required a lot of  
city assets.  We did not realize at the time, but I thought it [the tornado] would be  
the natural weather event of my tenure as mayor.  (W. Maddox, personal 
communication, November 26, 2012) 
 
Both Red Cross and city officials responded, albeit separately, after the storm.  
Mayor Maddox stated that during the response, he visited Oscar Barnes at the Red Cross 
facility to check on their relief efforts (W. Maddox, personal communication, November 
26, 2012).  Despite the visit from the Mayor, there was little mention from interview 
participants regarding any coordinated relief efforts between the city and the Red Cross, 
after the tornado.  Participants shared lessons learned from this tornado that were focused 
primarily on their respective organization’s performance instead of from a unified 
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command or interagency response perspective. 
Although there appeared to be little or no coordination between the city and the 
Red Cross following the storm, the tornado did prove to be beneficial to both 
organizations for several reasons.  According to Mayor Maddox, the tornado response 
provided an “outstanding practice” in the ICS process for city officials (W. Maddox, 
personal communication, November 26, 2012).  The response not only improved the 
city’s internal coordination between its representatives in the field and members of its 
Incident Command, it also provided ideas on debris removal procedures.  Lastly, the 
storm provided the city an idea of how to conduct humanitarian assistance.  The Mayor 
did not mention anything in regards to interagency coordination with the Red Cross, other 
than his visit to the shelter.  
For Dr. Horsley, the storm on April 15 was her first experience responding to a 
tornado event in Tuscaloosa as a PIO for the Red Cross (S. Horsley, personal 
communication, November 30, 2012).  From her perspective, the April 15 tornado 
provided an opportunity to learn how the local Red Cross chapter and state members 
respond in the wake of a natural disaster.  Additionally, Dr. Horsley learned about local 
Red Cross policies and procedures, such as how and where to establish a shelter if one 
was needed.  Since Tuscaloosa had not been through a recent disaster, this storm was a 
good way to polish off some of the rust that often comes from a lack of emergency 
responses.  Like Mayor Maddox, Dr. Horsley did not mention anything regarding any 
interagency coordination between the city and the Red Cross during the April 15 tornado. 
For the Regional Communications Officer, Chris Osborne, the April 15 storm 
proved that tornadoes could happen anywhere and at any time (C. Osborne, personal 
	   62	  
communication, December 4, 2012).  According to Osborne, one of the big lessons 
learned from April 15, was the importance of partnerships.  He detailed: 
One thing I remember so vividly was the [Red Cross’] cooperation with service  
animals.  One of our partner organizations brought in service animals for the  
children.  The kids just loved it.  The dogs seemed to take their mind off what was  
going on for a while.  Seeing the kids happy seemed to brighten up the parents  
too.  Obviously partnerships were an important part and are an important part of a  
response. (C. Osborne, personal communication, December 4, 2012)  
All the valuable lessons learned from April 15 would be put to the test less than fifteen 
days later on April 27. 
Crisis 
 On April 26, 2011, the chief meteorologist 
at FOX6 News, located in Birmingham, Alabama, 
forecasted that northern and central Alabama 
would experience “historically severe weather” 
(“April’s fury,” 2011).  According to FOX6 News 
Chief Meteorologist J-P Dice, northern and 
central Alabama was in store for a “high-impact 
weather event,” which included a threat for 
tornadoes.  Dice’s on-air colleague ominously 
stated that residents could be “expecting some 
long hours.”   
According to the weather channel, a tornado warning is issued when a tornado has 
been spotted, or an indication of a tornado exists on radar (“Tornado Watches &,” n.d.).  
Once a warning has been issued, the tornado is either occurring or imminent in the 
tornado warning area.  At approximately 3:30 a.m. on April 27, 2011, the National 
	  Figure	  9:	  FOX6	  News	  Weather	  Forecast	  on	  April	  26	  
	   63	  
Weather Service issued a tornado warning for Pickens County, which is located due west 
of Tuscaloosa County (“April’s fury,” 2011).  Within an hour, at approximately 4:16 
a.m., an EF-2 tornado touched  down in Aliceville, Alabama, which is located 
approximately 45 miles west of Tuscaloosa (“April’s fury,” 2011).  By daybreak, a total 
of three twisters, which included two EF-2 and one EF-3 tornado had touched in Pickens 
County, Birmingham, and Tuscaloosa County causing damage to homes and trees in all 
affected areas.  By 11:00 a.m., Alabama’s governor had declared a state of emergency. 
As tornadoes continued to affect parts of northern and central Alabama, city 
officials in Tuscaloosa closely monitored the weather from the ICC, located at City Hall, 
and made preparations as the storm approached the city (W. Maddox, personal 
communication, November 26, 2012).  As the storm approached, the city decided to stand 
up its ICC at around noon on April 27 (R. Edgeworth, personal communication, 
December 3, 2012).  Although most of the equipment required to operate the ICC, such 
as phones and computers were already in place, it took about three hours to get the 
command center up and running.   
Command center personnel consisted of staff members and colleagues that 
Edgeworth had worked with on numerous occasions and events over the years (R. 
Edgeworth, personal communication, December 3, 2012).  Although the command center 
consisted mainly of city officials, some outside organizations such as the Alabama 
Forestry Commission, had personnel who operated in the ICC.  The Red Cross had none 
of its members represented in the command center during response.  Additionally, none 
of the city officials mentioned in their interviews about any prior coordination with the 
Red Cross as the storm approached the city. 
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Red Cross personnel also monitored storm activity throughout the day (S. 
Horsley, personal communication, November 30, 2012).  Unlike the city, which had 
already initiated its ICS process, the Red Cross had its personnel on standby, waiting to 
respond once the storm had passed (O. Barnes, personal communication, December 19, 
2012).  25 Red Cross personnel from around the country, who had responded to the 
previous tornado on April 15, were already operating out of the local Red Cross chapter 
building.  According to Barnes, the local Red Cross chapter building was a mostly metal 
structure that would not adequately protect personnel in a storm of this magnitude.  
Fearing for safety of his volunteers and heeding the local weather reports of the potential 
dangers of this storm, Barnes had Red Cross personnel return to their hotels and other 
safe locations until the storm had passed. Barnes detailed: 
Everybody was carefully watching the weather system.  They [news] were 
reporting a strong system that was located in Mississippi.  I guess it convinced me 
that it [the storm] was definitely going to be a strong system that was going to 
impact our area as the way it [the storm] was described by our weather people.  
The weather people did a good job of emphasizing the fact that this would be a 
dangerous storm (O. Barnes, personal communication, December 19, 2012). 
 
According to Horsley, local Red Cross members waited in their homes as the 
tornado approached Tuscaloosa.  She detailed: 
This storm had been predicted for weeks, so everybody was on standby.  I don’t 
believe anyone had been deployed to Alabama because you don’t know where it 
[tornado] was going to go.  So I would say for several days prior, everyone was 
on standby.  And Oscar certainly had verified things, and made sure that resources 
were available…make sure that he knew where all the trailers were.  You know to 
haul cots and blankets.  Um, it was unusual for a tornado, since we actually did 
have some notice.  But no one had any idea that it would hit much of Alabama.  
There were 60 some tornadoes that day, just in our state, and nobody of course 
knew where it would land. (S. Horsley, personal communication, November 30, 
2012)  
 
As Red Cross members continued to wait for the tornado, Horsley used social media, 
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such as Twitter, to share information throughout the day in order to warn Tuscaloosa 
residents of the imminent storm.  Horsley coordinated with the National Weather Service 
and Emergency Management to keep abreast of storm information and updates.  None of 
the Red Cross members mentioned any interagency coordination with the city, as the 
tornado approached. 
 At approximately 5:13 p.m. on April 27, 
an EF-4 tornado, larger than a mile in diameter, 
touched down in Tuscaloosa and began a six-
mile path of destruction (Lynch, 2011).  
According to the National Weather Service, the 
tornado had maximum sustained winds of 
approximately 190 mph (“Tuscaloosa-
Birmingham EF,” 2012).  As the tornado 
touched down, Mayor Maddox and the unified 
command sought shelter in the basement of city 
hall until the storm passed (W. Maddox, 
personal communication, November 26, 2012).  After about five minutes, Mayor Maddox 
and his staff returned to the command center and watched the tornado on traffic cameras 
as the twister continued to devastate the city. 
 Once the storm passed, Barnes jumped into his vehicle and headed for the Red 
Cross chapter building (O. Barnes, personal communication, December 19, 2012).  Based 
on what he saw on television, Barnes knew that there would be lots of damage and that 
	  
Figure	  10:	  FOX6	  News	  Video	  of	  Tornado	  
	   66	  
this response would be large.  He also knew that this response would require a large 
number of response personnel to assist the residents of Tuscaloosa. 
 Once Barnes arrived at the chapter building, he noticed that all the windows were 
blown out, the roof was partially damaged, and water was inside the structure (O. Barnes, 
personal communication, December 19, 2012).  In addition to the chapter building being 
severely damaged, Barnes noticed that all the windows of the Red Cross emergency 
response vehicles had been blown out as well.  A tree also fell onto one of the Red Cross 
supply trailers that held blankets and cots for the shelter.  Barnes knew that he had to get 
supplies to the shelter, which was located at the Belk Center, as quickly as possible, so it 
could get set up and opened.   
 Based on the magnitude of this storm and his earlier observations of tornado 
damage and debris, Barnes assumed there would be large numbers of people who 
potentially lost homes who would need a shelter to go to (O. Barnes, personal 
communication, December 19, 2012).  The location of the shelter was selected in advance 
of the storm based on mutual agreements with the city and county.  The city and the Red 
Cross chose the Belk Center as a good location for a shelter because it had a back-up 
generator in case the city lost power, and it had communications capability for Red Cross 
members.  Additionally, the facility had the capacity to shelter a lot of people, as well as 
provide shower and restroom facilities for its inhabitants. 
 Like the Red Cross, the City of Tuscaloosa also experienced significant damages 
as a result of the storm.  In addition to the costly damages experienced by the citizens and 
residents of Tuscaloosa, the city’s emergency management resources and capabilities 
were severely reduced in the wake of the storm.  Several elements of Tuscaloosa’s 
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infrastructure were severely damaged or destroyed, including the Richard Curry facility 
that housed the county’s EMA (see Figure 11).  The city also lost some communication 
towers, more than 50 vehicles from the Environmental Services Department, a fire 
station, police station, and numerous other response equipment and resources (Lynch, 
2011).  Like the Red Cross and the county EMA, the Salvation Army also lost its shelter 
during the storm (W. Maddox, personal communication, November 26, 2012).  Within 
six minutes of touchdown, 12 percent of Tuscaloosa had been destroyed by the tornado 
and more than 7,000 people 
became unemployed (Lynch, 
2011).  The deadly storm also 
destroyed or damaged more than 
5,000 residences, damaged more 
than 600 businesses, injured 
more than 1,200 people, and 
resulted in 53 fatalities (Pow, 
2011).  The city of Tuscaloosa 
was in a crisis.      
Crisis Communication 
 Handling the volume of 
information required during emergencies and disasters can be extremely challenging.  
According to FEMA, the Joint Information System (JIS) provides a mechanism that 
allows for agencies to organize, integrate, and coordinate information in a timely manner 
(“Lesson 3: Joint,” n.d.).  Within a JIS, Joint Information Centers (JICS) are established 
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to facilitate information coordination among various agencies, by utilizing the resources 
of co-located PIOs (“Lesson 5:,” n.d.).   
 Despite the magnitude of this catastrophe, a Joint Information Center (JIC) was 
not established in Tuscaloosa for a couple of weeks (M. Lynch, personal communication, 
December 13, 2012).  Instead, the city handled all of its communication and media 
inquiries at its command center at City Hall, while the Red Cross conducted its press 
events at the Belk Center.  The city eventually set up a JIC inside the press box, which 
was located at the University of Alabama’s football stadium, about two weeks after the 
storm hit (M. Lynch, personal communication, December 13, 2012).  Setting up a JIC so 
late in a response did not make any sense to Lynch and other responders, because 
communications had already been established at City Hall.  Because of its 
ineffectiveness, the JIC was shut down soon after it was established.  Although Lynch 
and Horsley did not operate out of the JIC when it was operational, both the city and the 
Red Cross had at least one representative there to coordinate information. 
 Mayor Maddox acted as the city’s spokesperson throughout the crisis response 
(M. Lynch, personal communication, December 13, 2012).  According to Mayor Maddox 
(2012), the city’s communication’s strategy involved five points, which included: 
1. Communicate calm and hope 
2. Transparency 
3. Express the needs of the city and its residents 
4. Leverage social media 
5. Focus on local media coverage 
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During the first two weeks of the response, the Mayor held two to three daily press 
conferences at City Hall.  The press conferences were a joint effort, which allowed the 
mayor and other government officials to answer media inquiries, as well as provide 
updates on response efforts (R. Edgeworth, personal communication, December 3, 2012).  
Although the press conferences were considered to be joint, because there was 
coordination among various local and state government agencies, non-government 
agencies and nonprofits, such as the Red Cross, were not involved or included to 
participate in the communication process during the response.  Additionally, the city 
made no efforts to coordinate command messaging regarding the response with the Red 
Cross throughout the crisis.  Personnel who regularly attended the press conferences 
included Edgeworth, who was the Incident Commander, the County EMA Director, the 
sheriff, and Mayor Maddox.   
 In addition to the city’s daily press conferences, information given to the public 
regarding response operations was done via press releases and social media (R. 
Edgeworth, personal communication, December 3, 2012).  All Unified Command press 
releases were drafted internally by the city without input from any outside organizations 
such as the Red Cross.  According to Edgeworth, when the city needed to coordinate with 
first responders in the field, or other government agencies such as the County EMA and 
local and state law enforcement, coordination would be done via email correspondence 
and voice communication, using devices such as hand-held Southern Link radios.   
 While the Mayor acted as the city’s spokesperson throughout the response, 
Meredith Lynch handled media inquiries, set up press conferences, and transmitted the 
Unified Command messages over social media, using Twitter and Facebook (M. Lynch, 
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personal communication, December 13, 2012).  Despite familiarity with her colleagues 
on the mayor’s staff, Lynch had no personal interaction with members of the Red Cross 
prior to April 27 (M. Lynch, personal communication, December 13, 2012).  Although 
Lynch did not personally interact with the Red Cross before the storm, she interacted 
frequently with them through social media, in order to transmit information to the public.  
Lynch’s interaction on social media was limited to the organization’s social media sites 
and not personal interaction with specific individuals.  
 Unlike many organizations who fail to use social media before a crisis, the City of 
Tuscaloosa used Facebook and Twitter prior to April 27, 2011, to pass general 
information to the public (R. Edgeworth, personal communication, December 3, 2012).  
Early in the response, the city used its website to pass information to the public (M. 
Lynch, personal communication, December 13, 2012).  However, city officials quickly 
realized that its website became ineffective when Tuscaloosa residents were actively 
engaged in social media to receive and share information.  Additionally, the website was 
too difficult to maintain and social media provided a faster avenue to communicate to a 
mass audience.  
 During the response, Lynch not only used the city’s Facebook and Twitter 
accounts to transmit Unified Command messages to the public, but she also used them as 
a method to receive information from Tuscaloosa residents during the crisis phase (M. 
Lynch, personal communication, December 13, 2012).  Twitter users reported real-time 
information such as road closures, the location of debris and downed trees, as well as the 
location of residents that experienced injuries and fatalities (R. Edgeworth, personal 
communication, December 3, 2012).  In addition to real-time data and information, 
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Twitter enabled the Unified Command to share interagency information with the public 
(M. Lynch, personal communication, December 13, 2012).  For example, when the Red 
Cross tweeted information regarding where people could go for shelter or get food and 
water, Lynch re-tweeted the information on the city’s Twitter account.  Lynch felt that 
Twitter was the fastest method to get information to the broadest audience regarding 
response efforts.  Lastly, the city utilized its digital billboards to pass information to 
Tuscaloosa residents.  Lynch tweeted information to a company, which would display the 
message on various digital billboards around the city to get information to Tuscaloosa 
residents.  According to Lynch, the digital billboards were utilized only by the city. 
 When asked if she ever picked up the phone to speak with her counterparts at the 
Red Cross to collaborate, coordinate, or verify information passed over social media, 
Lynch stated that she did not (M. Lynch, personal communication, December 13, 2012).  
Lynch assumed that information tweeted from large reputable organizations such as the 
Red Cross or the Salvation Army was accurate and correct.   
 Like the city, the Red Cross ran its own communications operation, which was 
located at the Belk Center (S. Horsley, personal communication, November 30, 2012).   
The Belk Center was not only a shelter for disaster victims, it also acted as the local 
Disaster Operations Center (DOC) for the Red Cross.  According to Horsley, her 
immediate priority as a PIO was to speak with national media regarding the crisis.  As a 
credentialed Red Cross spokesperson at the national and international levels, Horsley 
knew that she had to get the Red Cross story out to the national media.  She wanted to 
make sure that people around the country knew how they could help the Red Cross out 
and how they could send resources.  Although she worked closely with local media, 
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Horsley knew that most of the support that the Red Cross needed would come from a 
national audience. 
 In her role as PIO, Dr. Horsley had very little interaction with first responders 
from other organizations (S. Horsley, personal communications, November 30, 2012).  
She detailed: 
 I didn’t work in a JIC because I didn’t have time.  I literally put in 12- to 14-hour 
days just to keep up with the media who was showing up at the shelter.  And 
because it was a Red Cross shelter and not a government shelter, I was the 
spokesperson.  I’ve been on other deployments where I worked with PIOs from 
EMAs and other organizations, but this one was pretty limited because of the 
shear amount of the media.  So I had my place where I was doing media.  EMA 
had their place where they were doing media.  The city had their place.  Salvation 
Army had their place.  We didn’t really interact much on this case.  (S. Horsley, 
personal communication, November 30, 2012). 
 
Dr. Horsley conducted the majority of her press conferences and media interviews at the 
Belk Center.  Her press conferences did not involve any representatives from the city.  
Because the JIC had not been established and there was no central location for media to 
congregate, reporters spread out throughout the city to get their stories.  The majority of 
media outlets went to the Belk Center because many of the storm survivors were 
temporarily sheltered there.  According to Dr. Horsley, if the EOC and the Salvation 
Army had not been destroyed, then she would have operated out of one of those locations 
to conduct her press conferences and media interviews.  Because the media kept showing 
up at the shelter, Dr. Horsley continued to conduct her interviews there.   
 Running crisis communications from the Belk Center had its advantages and 
disadvantages (S. Horsley, personal communication, November 30, 2012).  Because the 
facility was large, it had the space and the infrastructure required to support an 
emergency operation.  Additionally, media interviews at the Belk Center allowed the 
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press and public to witness first-hand how the Red Cross handled the response.  
However, using the Belk Center as the primary location to conduct media interviews 
presented some challenges for Dr. Horsley and her colleagues.  For example, the facility 
doubled as the local operations center and a shelter, simultaneously, which made it a 
difficult and distracting environment to conduct media interviews.  Dr. Horsley 
mentioned that it would not be out of the ordinary to conduct a media interview outside 
the facility as an ambulance was pulling up to take away a sick or injured citizen.  
Additionally, the people who owned and operated the facility locked all the office doors 
prior to the storm, thus rendering all the offices, computers, and phones to be 
inaccessible. 
 Like the city, the Red Cross also relied on press conferences, press releases, and 
social media to transmit messages to the public and the media (S. Horsley, personal 
communication, November 30, 2012).  Because cell phone towers had been destroyed in 
the storm, the Red Cross relied heavily on its mobile communications vehicles to boost 
their communications capabilities.  The mobile communications vehicles, which were 
provided by national Red Cross resources, operated in a similar capacity as a satellite 
trucks or cell towers would, which gave the first responders the ability to transmit and 
communicate, when local cell towers were not operational or damaged.   
 Before the communications vehicles were available, Red Cross responders relied 
heavily on personal cell phones and text messaging to communicate with one another 
until they got access to Southern Link hand-held devices (S. Horsley, personal 
communication, November 30, 2012).  Additionally, personal cell phones enabled 
Horsley to provide information updates via Twitter to the media, Red Cross 
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Headquarters, and the public.  It was not uncommon during the early stages of the 
response to coordinate media availabilities and press conferences with reporters over 
Twitter, while interviews were conducted over a cell phone.   
 Throughout the response, Dr. Horsley relied on the regional Red Cross DOC in 
Birmingham to provide PIO support (S. Horsley, personal communication, November 30, 
2012).  As the main Red Cross’ hub and central processing point for information 
throughout the state, the DOC provided Dr. Horsley with consistent daily messaging, 
talking points, and news releases to keep her and other first responders abreast of 
response operations.  The DOC also provided information regarding how many shelters 
were open in the region, or where the food trucks were located.  Since Dr. Horsley 
primarily relied on the DOC for messaging, she did not coordinate with the city before 
making any statements or releasing any information to the media.  According to Dr. 
Horsley, the Red Cross stayed in its lane during interviews.  She detailed: 
In terms of what we did with the Red Cross, we only answered Red Cross 
questions.  We stayed in our lane.  We never answered questions about the 
number of fatalities or number of injuries.  None of that was our purview.  We 
stuck to Red Cross things. (S. Horsley, personal communication, November 30, 
2012)  
  
  According to Edgeworth, the city did not request any resources from the Red 
Cross during the response (R. Edgeworth, personal communication, December 3, 2012).  
Instead, the mayor coordinated with neighboring cities and the state, via cell phone and 
text message, when requesting additional assistance with resources such as extra law 
enforcement, firefighters, and National Guard troops (M. Maddox, personal 
communication, November 26, 2012).  Throughout the response, when cell towers were 
down, Mayor Maddox relied heavily on text messaging to communicate and coordinate 
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with the Governor and other mayors.  Because text messaging did not require the same 
bandwidth as a normal cell phone call, the mayor used this tool as his primary means to 
communicate and coordinate resources throughout the response. 
 The Red Cross also relied on its own resources throughout the response (C. 
Osborne, personal communication, December 4, 2012).  According to Osborne, local Red 
Cross members and volunteers typically respond to routine emergencies such as house 
fires and local incidents.  Once the emergency crosses a certain dollar threshold, then it 
becomes a regional response when the Red Cross can mobilize additional resources to 
assist.  Once the regional threshold is surpassed, the emergency becomes a national 
Disaster Response Operation (DRO), where the Red Cross can pull in all available human 
and equipment resources to respond to the disaster.  Most of the supplies such as 
computers, tables, chairs, etc., are housed in warehouses around the country and can be 
shipped immediately when needed.  Because of the Red Cross’ internal logistics system, 
it did not request additional resources from the city for this response.    
 One of the challenges in any disaster is accounting for all the displaced persons 
who need a shelter after a storm hits.  The ultimate goal is to ensure that people who need 
temporary shelter can move into something more permanent as soon as possible (R. 
Edgeworth, personal communication, December 3, 2012).  Because the storm destroyed 
the Salvation Army’s shelter, which normally provides housing for the chronically 
homeless, and the Red Cross shelter, which supplies housing for displaced families, both 
groups of people were forced to share the same facility at the Belk Center (O. Barnes, 
personal communication, December 19, 2012).  Additionally, people who did not 
necessarily need the shelter, such as contractors who came from other towns to help out 
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with the response, also occupied the shelter (R. Edgeworth, personal communication, 
December 3, 2012).  
 The City of Tuscaloosa, the Red Cross, and the Salvation Army faced logistical 
challenges regarding the placement of the chronically homeless and residents who had 
lost their homes during the storm.  Under normal circumstances, the Salvation Army 
Shelter provides shelter for the chronically homeless, whereas the Red Cross provides 
shelter for those residents who lost their home due to a disaster.  Since the Salvation 
Army’s shelter was destroyed in this storm, the chronically homeless were forced to share 
the shelter with people who lost their homes during the storm.  At its peak, the Belk 
Center provided shelter for approximately 500 people.  Since there was no tracking 
system in place to monitor who was coming and going from the shelter, it became 
difficult to determine which people actually needed the shelter and which people did not.  
Additionally, it created confusions regarding jurisdictional responsibility over the 
homeless and the displaced Tuscaloosa residents.  One Red Cross member detailed:   
The Salvation Army’s homeless shelter was gone.  They [the city] could not 
understand why we couldn’t do anything for them [the homeless].  That was not 
our mission.  Our mission was to take care of the people that were affected by the 
disaster.  You know some of the homeless people were impacted, but we weren’t 
a homeless shelter.  But, we weren’t going to turn anybody down and tell anybody 
to leave. (personal communication, December, 2012) 
 
To rectify this problem, the city coordinated with the Red Cross to send case officers to 
the shelter.  The case officers assisted in keeping track of who actually belonged in the 
shelter and who did not.   
Post-Crisis 
 Every crisis eventually comes to an end, allowing for organizations to return to a 
state of normalcy (Coombs, 2010).  During the post-crisis phase, organizations can take 
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the opportunity to reflect and learn from their experiences.  Organizations learn from 
crises by collecting data, conducting analysis, and evaluating their crisis management 
efforts (Coombs, 2012).  Additionally, organizations that are willing to take the time and 
energy to be honest and open about mistakes that were made during past crises will reap 
the benefits of improved performance during future events (Coombs, 2012).   
 The city of Tuscaloosa transitioned into the post-crisis phase approximately one 
year after the tornado struck the city (R. Edgeworth, personal communication, December 
3, 2012).  Unlike the city, whose crisis phase lasted significantly longer, the Red Cross 
transitioned into the post-crisis phase in a little over two months (S. Horsley, personal 
communication, November 30, 2012).  According to Horsley, the Red Cross made its 
transition from crisis to post-crisis once media attention dissipated. 
Like in any disaster or emergency, this storm created opportunities for the city 
and the Red Cross to learn many valuable lessons regarding its emergency management 
and response efforts.  As evidenced in previous sections, this storm created 
unprecedented challenges for both the city and the Red Cross.  For example, despite its 
redundant systems, the city still faced the challenge of dealing with the loss of the 
majority of its emergency management and environmental service capabilities (W. 
Maddox, personal communication, November 26, 2012).  Another challenge that the city 
faced involved the handling of its volunteers (W. Maddox, personal communication, 
November 26, 2012).  Mayor Maddox detailed: 
We struggled a long time with volunteers.  When we lost the Red Cross, Salvation 
Army, and the Tuscaloosa EMA [facilities], those were three legs of our stool that 
supported those [volunteer] services.  When their facilities and resources were 
wiped from the map, we struggled.  It took us 72 to 96 hours to really understand 
how to organize our volunteers.  How to coordinate them in such a manner to be 
effective. (W. Maddox, personal communication, November 26, 2012) 
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The city also struggled with identification of its missing persons.  Because 
Tuscaloosa is a college town, the city was overwhelmed with locating missing persons.  
The fact that cell towers were also down exacerbated the situation, because family 
members could not contact their sons or daughters at the university.  Instead, family 
members called the local police departments, which quickly overwhelmed the system.     
Once this storm wiped out much of the emergency management and response 
infrastructure for both organizations, it became clear that primary disaster management 
plans were no longer effective or useful.  Because no one had imagined that a storm of 
this magnitude would strike Tuscaloosa, coupled with the fact that there were no 
contingency plans that were prepared to handle the loss of the EMA, Salvation Army and 
Red Cross facilities, and communications capabilities were severely limited or 
unavailable, both organizations were forced to be create plans on the fly to deal with this 
response.  For these reasons, both organizations really struggled during the early stages of 
the response. 
One of the important lessons that the mayor highlighted involved preparation (W. 
Maddox, personal communication, November 26, 2012).  According to the mayor, much 
of the groundwork for this response had been done through the FEMA training at 
Emmitsburg.  Additionally, the April 15 storm also provided an excellent opportunity for 
first responders practice a real response before April 27.  Both events helped train city 
officials and first responders in disaster preparedness, but they also put emergency 
protocols in place, which helped facilitate response efforts on April 27.  The mayor also 
highlighted the importance of personal relationships.  He detailed: 
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The attorneys will tell you that formal [relationships] are more important, but I 
will argue that the personal are more important.  When you know someone, you 
get an understanding of what they are experiencing.  You have a heart to make 
sure you provide resources immediately.  Let me give you a quick story.  The 
mayor of North Fork, which is a community next to us, that wasn’t damaged by 
the storm, could not reach me by phone.  But he sent a text message and said, 
“Walt, we are coming across the bridge.”  And that night, North Fork sent dozens 
of police officers, and every bit of their public works into the city.  That is 
because Mayor Herndon and I are friends and colleagues.  That is a personal 
relationship.  The personal relationships, whether it was the superintendents of the 
schools or whether it was the Red Cross or the governor, those things 
[relationships] are extremely important in a crisis.  Making sure bonds are there 
are very important. (W. Maddox, personal communication, November 26, 2012) 
 
Mayor Maddox did not discuss any lessons learned regarding coordinated response 
efforts between the city and the Red Cross during his interview.  
 According to one city official, one area that did cause some challenges involved 
the national Red Cross response to the storm (personal communication, December, 2012).  
According to this individual, once the Red Cross lost its facility after the storm, local Red 
Cross members turned to people from the region and national headquarters to assist with 
the response.  Being unfamiliar with regional and national Red Cross protocols on 
handling responses, roles and responsibilities became less clear to city officials.  This 
individual detailed: 
I think for me personally, understanding better everyone’s role in the response of 
what they actually do as opposed to what maybe I expected them to do.  I feel that 
is something that an ongoing relationship or improved relationship could help. 
(Personal communication, December 2012) 
  
 Like the Mayor, the city’s public relations coordinator, Meredith Lynch, 
mentioned the importance of relationships, specifically with outside organizations and the 
media (M. Lynch, personal communication, December 13, 2012).  She detailed: 
I think having a stronger relationship with all my media outlets and other 
organizations that were trying to get messages out to the city and from the city 
would have really increased the amount of value for all things that we reiterated to 
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the citizens.  It [response] really was about relationships, which I wish could have 
been stronger.  I think now everyone knows exactly who to talk to because they 
had to work with each other constantly after the tornado to find information.  And 
now, they are always going to have that name and number that they can go to if 
something else heaven forbid happens again. (M. Lynch, personal 
communication, December 13, 2012) 
 
 The Red Cross also learned valuable lessons from this disaster.  According to 
Horsley, one organization can’t do it all (S. Horsley, personal communication, November 
30, 2012).  Because this was such a large response, the Red Cross relied on many other 
nonprofit organizations as well as the private sector to help out in other non-Red Cross 
mission areas.  For example, the Red Cross contacted local optometrists to help residents 
who had lost their eyeglasses in the storm.  The Red Cross also reached out to local 
dentist and other people who could help residents with denture replacements.  They also 
coordinated with groups that offered babysitting services so that parents could handle any 
administrative issues or conduct salvage operations at their homes. 
 Dr. Horsley also echoed the importance of establishing relationships during non-
disaster times (S. Horsley, personal communication, November 30, 2012).  She detailed: 
We have also have learned that we need to develop these relationships during 
non-disaster times.  That was pretty obvious to me.  I was a new comer.  I really 
wasn’t a part of the community, but I am now.  You know, that was another thing 
that we all had to learn.  How important it is to develop those relationships.  I 
think at least for now that everybody still is in that [building relationships] mode.  
You know, we are still very much recovering and it [the tornado] is still very 
much in people’s minds.  I think we knew this before, but it really brought home 
the fact that we can’t do this by ourselves. (S. Horsley, personal communication, 
November 30, 2012)   
 
 Like Dr. Horsley, Osborne also stressed the importance of partnerships during any 
crisis (C. Osborne, personal communication, December 4, 2012).  Osborne echoed the 
same sentiment as Dr. Horsley when he stated that, one organization can’t handle a large-
scale disaster by itself.  He also added that it is beneficial to a crisis response when 
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organizations know each other’s roles and they understand each other’s capabilities.  He 
detailed: 
I think again that partnerships are key.  Staying in your lane is key.  There are 
certain things that are in the parameters of every organization.  You know, 
building those relationships whether informal or formal, ahead of time, will let 
you know what a particular agency is capable of or what a particular government 
entity can and cannot do.  And so, you can manage your expectations when 
something happens, if you know, up front, what those parameters are.  So I would 
say relationship building is key. (C. Osborne, personal communication, December 
4, 2012)   
 
Osborne admitted that the Red Cross needed to do a better job of educating the public and 
“officials” on the day-to-day roles and responsibilities of the Red Cross.  The education 
process also included informing the public on how the Red Cross, at all levels, responds 
during emergencies and disasters.  In the end, Osborne believes that this disaster resulted 
in a better mutual understanding of the missions, roles, responsibilities, capabilities, and 
limitations that both the city and the Red Cross possess.   
 According to Barnes, one of the most difficult challenges during this disaster 
involved the lack of communication between the city and the Red Cross (O. Barnes, 
personal communication, December 19, 2012).  Barnes stated that the city had a hard 
time knowing what the Red Cross was doing and vice versa.  Although the Red Cross had 
a representative working at the EOC, Barnes still had a difficult time knowing the city’s 
response plan.  One way to resolve this challenge is to foster better relationships and 
improve interagency coordination (O. Barnes, personal communication, December 14, 
2012).  However, he emphasized that relationships and coordination alone were not 
enough for successful interagency coordination.  Instead, for organizations to be 
successful during a crisis, all echelons of the organizations needed to have established 
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relationships with one another.  Additionally, all echelons of the organizations also 
needed to understand everyone’s roles and responsibilities.  Barnes detailed: 
Leaders depend on their people to report information to them as well as providing 
information on what other agencies are doing.  However, if the person doing the 
reporting doesn’t have a clear understanding of what our agency is doing, then the 
leadership is not going to get a good report. (O. Barnes, personal communication, 
December 14, 2012)  
 
Lastly, he emphasized the importance of conducting joint meetings before and during a 
crisis (O. Barnes, December 14, 2012).  According to Barnes, the city probably held its 
own disaster planning meetings before and during the crisis.  However, outside 
organizations such as the Red Cross neither participated in these meetings nor were 
invited to them.  Barnes believes it would have been beneficial for everyone, if outside 
organizations like the Red Cross, were allowed to participate in some of these meetings, 
so issues could be addressed and resolved before a crisis happened.  After a thorough 
narrative detailing the crisis management actions during the three stages of this crisis, the 
following sections will provide some analysis and recommendations for future disasters. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER VI:  Discussion, Recommendations, & Conclusion 
Although every crisis is different, each one has an identifiable life cycle (Coombs, 
2012; Gonazales-Herrero & Pratt, 1995; Sturges, 1994).  The crisis that spawned from the 
Tuscaloosa tornado proved to be no different.  It’s important for decision makers and 
managers to be familiar with the crisis life cycle, because the decisions and actions made 
during all three phases of pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis, will not only affect the 
outcome of the response, but it will also help determine whether or not the response was 
a success in the eyes of the stakeholder.   
Another equally important aspect to crisis management revolves around 
relationships.  According to Coombs (2000), understanding the relational perspective not 
only provides managers valuable insights regarding the crisis, it also allows them to 
develop effective responses.  Successful crisis management also results when 
organizations build alliances, achieve coordination, and share information with their 
stakeholders (Pearson & Clair, 1998).  Alliance building and information sharing is 
important to an organization’s success because stakeholders have “intrinsic value” and 
their perceptions can threaten an organization’s legitimacy.  
It is fair to say that relationships alone are not enough to be successful in a crisis.  
Obviously, relationships centered on mutual trust, involvement, and cooperation, 
ultimately help organizations perform better during a crisis.  According to Nathan and 
Mitroff (1991), it is important that relationships and crisis management focus on 
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stakeholder involvement.  To be more effective during a crisis, organizations should not 
only involve as many stakeholders as possible during the crisis preparation and response 
stages, they should also allow stakeholders to share their own “perspective, identity, and 
knowledge to the analysis” (p. 164).  In order for this to be accomplished, Alpaslan et al. 
(2009) argue that treatment between both parties must be “sincere” and the relationship 
should be based on mutual trust and cooperation.   
As previously mentioned, the first step in Coombs’ (2012) three-stage approach to 
crisis management is the pre-crisis stage.  During the pre-crisis stage, Coombs suggests 
that members of the organization take proactive measures to ensure that a crisis is 
prevented.  The pre-crisis stage is also the optimum time to establish interagency 
relationships, because it gives organizations an opportunity to get to know each other, 
establish roles and responsibilities, and share strengths and weaknesses under less 
stressful conditions.   
Pre-crisis Relationship Status 
In order to answer RQ1, which focused solely on the pre-crisis stage, I first 
examined interagency actions taken between the Red Cross and the city prior to the storm 
to determine whether a relationship existed or not.  As a review, Coombs (2012) defines 
relationships as the “interdependence of two or more groups” (p. 36).  For the purpose of 
this study, the organizations met the definition of a relationship when evidence suggested 
that personal or formal relationships existed.  Personal relationships existed if individuals 
from the Red Cross and the city interacted with one another.  Interaction could be 
accomplished through informal or formal meetings, face-to-face interaction, email 
correspondence, personal communication, and others involving disaster planning, 
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preparations, or training.  Formal relationships existed if there were any documents such 
as memoranda of agreement (MOAs) or memoranda of understanding (MOUs) in place 
between the two organizations regarding disaster planning and emergency management.    
If a relationship existed, I also attempted to determine the strength of the 
relationship between the two organizations.  Relationship strength was determined by 
observing the frequency of interaction between the Red Cross and city personnel, prior to 
the storm.  Frequency of interaction was based on the amount of personal contact 
between individuals during actual responses or training exercises, informal or formal 
meetings, face-to-face interaction, email correspondence, personal communication, and 
others involving disaster planning and preparation.  Lastly, a review of the city’s crisis 
action plan (CAP) was conducted to see if there was evidence to show any intent 
regarding potential interagency coordination during a disaster response.  
Based on the results of the qualitative interviews, there is some evidence that 
suggests that both formal and informal relationships existed between the city and the Red 
Cross prior to April 27.  Despite this finding, there is also evidence that suggests that the 
relationship strength can be classified as weak or not fully developed based on the little 
interaction between the two organizations.  This will be explained further in the following 
paragraphs.  But before I proceed, it is worth mentioning the discrepancy between how 
interview participants defined the characteristics of a strong relationship and their lack of 
coordination throughout the crisis.  
When asked to define the elements that make up a strong relationship, interview 
participants said all the right things, such as strong relationships require communication, 
trust, sharing resources, and face-to-face interaction.  However, there was little to no 
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evidence by the interviewees that showed that relationship building actions were taken 
prior to and during the response.  Several factors could explain why this is so.  For 
example, interview participants could be satisfying me as the interviewer to tell me what 
I wanted to hear, whether they believed in the definitions or not.  The possibility also 
exists that these definitions were lessons learned from their experiences and the elements 
interview participants talked about describe the actions that they should have taken to 
ensure better coordination before, during, and after the response.  The third possibility 
could be that normal day-to-day operations or other organizational requirements 
prevented participants from establishing strong relationships with their counterparts. 
The majority of interviewees mentioned that they had no prior contact with their 
counterparts before April 27, 2011.  Similarly, interview participants rarely contacted 
members of either organization during the crisis response and post-crisis phases as well.  
Despite the fact that there was little contact between the two organizations, the majority 
of participants all stated that they could get in touch with their counterparts if needed.  It 
is interesting to note that the majority of interview participants did not possess the name, 
phone, or email contact information of their counterparts prior to the storm.  However, 
they could get this information from a supervisor or another person within their 
organization if they needed it.  Despite interviewees not having contact information of 
their counterparts, other members within his or her organization had this information, 
which was an indicator that a prior relationship existed between the two organizations. 
Regarding personal relationships, interviews revealed that they existed at the 
strategic management level between Mayor Maddox and Oscar Barnes, who was the 
Executive Director of the West Alabama Chapter of the Red Cross (W. Maddox, personal 
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communication, November 26, 2012).  Mayor Maddox mentioned that he and Oscar 
Barnes had a personal relationship for “some time” and thus attributed much of his 
knowledge of the Red Cross’ missions and capabilities based on this relationship.  Unlike 
the personal relationship at the strategic management level, there is little evidence to 
suggest that relationships existed at subordinate levels such as PIO, Incident Commander, 
and Regional Communications Officer.  The majority of interview participants holding 
these positions described that they had little to no interaction with their counterparts 
before April 27. 
There are several reasons that may explain why personal relationships were 
lacking between Red Cross and city personnel at the subordinate levels.  One reason that 
explains this absence is the fact that vacancies existed with the city’s key emergency 
response positions, such as PIO and the Liaison Officer, prior to the storm.  Therefore, 
there was no counterpart to contact.  As previously mentioned, the city did not have a 
full-time public relations coordinator, PIO, or Liaison Officer prior to the storm.  
Meredith Lynch eventually filled the position of public relations coordinator or PIO; 
however, the Liaison Officer remained vacant.   
Another reason for a lack of personal relationships may be based on the fact that 
the Red Cross is made up mostly of volunteers.  During non-crisis times, Red Cross 
volunteers usually hold other full-time jobs or live in other parts of the country, so the 
availability of its members can be fairly limited.  It’s not until a crisis that readily 
available volunteers show up to respond to an emergency.   
At the time of the tornado, the local Red Cross chapter in Tuscaloosa only had 
four full-time employees.  The Red Cross members who responded to the storm consisted 
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mainly of volunteers and national members.  Dr. Horsley, who fulfilled the role of PIO 
during the storm, was a Red Cross volunteer, who also happens to live in Tuscaloosa.  
During non-disaster times, Dr. Horsley is a full-time professor at the University of 
Alabama.  Also contributing to Dr. Horsley’s lack of established relationships with other 
first responders from the city was the fact that she was new to the area, having only lived 
in Tuscaloosa for a year and a half prior to April 27.  During that time period, Dr. 
Horsley and the Red Cross had not responded to any major disasters or emergencies prior 
to the tornado that hit on April 15, thus giving her little opportunity to coordinate, 
respond, and establish relationships with other first responders from the city. 
Another contributing factor that explains the lack of relationship building between 
the two organizations is the preexisting policies and agreements regarding disaster 
management between Tuscaloosa County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) and 
the Red Cross.  As one interviewee explained, it is not unusual that the Red Cross played 
a role in the county EMA structure and not with the city (Personal communication, 
December 2012).  For this reason, the Red Cross was a partner with the county and not 
the city.   
According to Mayor Maddox, the Red Cross and the county EMA had a long-
standing formal relationship (W. Maddox, personal communication, November 26, 
2012).  Because of this formal relationship, the Red Cross and the county EMA shared 
mutual agreements regarding disaster planning, which included discussions about 
sheltering operations and coordinated training exercises.  Additionally, during disaster 
response, policy and procedures dictated that the city and the Red Cross coordinate their 
emergency response through the county EMA and not with each other.  In the case of this 
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disaster, the pre-established relationship and agreements proved to be beneficial for 
several reasons.  First, a suitable shelter location and facility was already pre-determined 
before the storm struck, which facilitated first responders and managers from both 
organizations on where to send people who needed it.  Second, because of the pre-
established relationship, the shelter was able to open quickly following the storm, 
allowing for Tuscaloosa residents to immediately access and use the facility.    
When asked if the city requested any Red Cross resources during the storm, the 
answer was no.  However, the city had mutual agreements in place with the county EMA 
as well as with other towns within the state (W. Maddox, personal communication, 
November 26, 2012).  Some mutual agreements were formal, but many were informal 
because of the friendships Mayor Maddox had developed with his colleagues.  Because 
of these informal relationships, the mayor knew that Tuscaloosa would receive human 
and material resources if needed during a disaster by other municipalities.  This proved to 
be the case in this storm as evidenced by the resources the city received from its 
neighbors after April 27.  This reason might be one explanation why the mayor did not 
reach out to the Red Cross for any additional resources during the storm. 
Although the city and the Red Cross did not take advantage of training exercises 
or actual responses to improve relationships with one another, other opportunities existed 
for them to grow their relationship.  One example is the aforementioned Alabama 
Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (AL VOAD).  AL VOAD is a network of 
nonprofit and faith-based organizations that was established to work together in an effort 
to reduce the effects of disasters (“About Alabama VOAD,” n.d.).  According to Barnes, 
this group met periodically to discuss different disasters scenarios (O. Barnes, personal 
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communication, December 19, 2012).  AL VOAD would have provided an excellent 
opportunity to build alliances, coordinate disaster planning, discuss the potential for 
sharing resources, as well as discuss roles and responsibilities between the two 
organizations.  Unfortunately, the city did not have a representative in the organization 
and no interviewees explained why they did not participate in this group.  AL VOAD was 
a missed opportunity for city officials that might have helped them prepare and 
coordinate for the tornado on April 27.   
Relationship Strength 
Another important aspect regarding the relationship between the city and the Red 
Cross is centered on its strength.  After all, what good is a relationship if it is not a strong 
one?  It is evident in this case that the relationship strength between the city and the Red 
Cross can be classified as weak or barely developed, based on the little interaction 
between the two organizations before April 27.  During the signal detection phase of the 
pre-crisis, Mayor Maddox recognized nearly two years prior to the storm the importance 
of interagency coordination and ICS training.  However, despite having an interagency 
presence at Emmitsburg, there was little evidence to suggest significant levels of 
coordination or interaction between the Red Cross and the city as evidenced by the 
comments made by interview participants.   
Although city officials sang the praises of the FEMA training for its realistic 
scenarios and interagency coordination aspects, Red Cross representatives did not share 
the same sentiment.  The Red Cross felt it was underutilized during the full-scale 
exercise.  Instead of developing a scenario that used a wider range of Red Cross missions 
and capabilities during an emergency or disaster, the Red Cross’ role was limited to 
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sheltering operations.  Not only was the Red Cross limited to sheltering operations, the 
scenario did not require exercise participants to go through the steps required to establish 
a shelter, which eliminated any opportunity to practice interagency coordination and 
planning.  The lack of the FEMA training to fully utilize the Red Cross’ full spectrum of 
capabilities during the full-scale exercise was another missed opportunity prior to the 
storm to work out any coordination issues in a safe and sterile exercise environment.  
Additionally, lack of Red Cross involvement in the disaster scenario was a missed 
opportunity to discuss capabilities, limitations, roles and responsibilities between the two 
organizations in a non-disaster environment.  Of note, lack of Red Cross participation 
during the full-scale exercise was solely a function of the FEMA scenario and not due to 
the city failing to use the Red Cross or the Red Cross failing to participate in the exercise.  
If the Red Cross had a greater role in the full-scale exercise in 2009, lessons learned from 
that experience might have resulted in improved interagency coordination during the 
tornado response in 2011. 
Pearson and Clair (1998) argue that organizational success is determined by the 
level of accuracy of an organization’s understanding of how their stakeholders will 
behave during a crisis.  Based on the observation of Red Cross member opinions, it is 
clear that some members of the city’s response team did not fully understand how the 
Red Cross would behave in a crisis.  For example, some Red Cross members felt that 
certain city officials at various levels of the chain of command were not aware of the full 
scope of the Red Cross’ capabilities and missions.  City officials also admitted that they 
struggled to understand Red Cross operational protocols and procedures once regional 
and national assets became involved with the response (personal communication, 
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December, 2012).  Despite this perceived lack of understanding of the Red Cross’ 
missions and capabilities, according to the mayor, he was fully aware of the capabilities 
of the Red Cross (W. Maddox, personal communication, November 26, 2012).   
This apparent discrepancy regarding the Red Cross’ capabilities is another 
indication that the relationship strength between the two organizations was weak.  If the 
relationships were strong between the two organizations, there would be no 
misunderstanding from either party of what their roles and responsibilities would be 
during a disaster.  Additionally, there would be no misunderstanding of what their 
capabilities and limitations are during a disaster response.  Unfortunately in this situation, 
the Red Cross’ main mission was perceived to be sheltering by some city officials.  As 
one individual mentioned in the interview, sheltering is just a small part of the Red Cross’ 
mission (Red Cross representative, personal communication, December 2012).  In 
defense of the city, the Red Cross admitted that they needed to do a better job of 
educating the public and other organizations about their missions.  Improved 
communication and education regarding their missions might help the Red Cross prepare 
for future disasters as it continues to develop and build relationships with other 
organizations. 
Another indication that the relationship between the city and the Red Cross was 
weak was evidenced by the lack of interagency coordination during training exercises 
following Emmitsburg, as well as a lack of coordination during actual emergencies, such 
as the tornado of April 15.  Although the Red Cross routinely coordinated responses with 
local fire and police departments during apartment and home fires, as well as conducted 
emergency management training with county EMA, there was no evidence of joint 
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training or exercises between it and the city.  Despite receiving FEMA training at 
Emmitsburg, the city was still relatively new at using ICS.  In order to hone their skills, 
the mayor utilized the ICS structure as much as possible during routine city events.  
However, these routine city events did not involve organizations such as the Red Cross, 
which might have proved beneficial during an actual emergency response.  One has to 
wonder, if the city fully understood all of the Red Cross’ capabilities and limitations, 
would they have invited them to participate in the more routine events?   
Although at the time, the EF-3 tornado from April 15 was thought of as a 
significant event to Tuscaloosa residents, there was little to no evidence to suggest that 
the city and the Red Cross coordinated the response effort or shared any resources.  When 
interview participants were asked questions regarding lessons learned from April 15, 
most discussed how the storm gave each of their respective agencies an opportunity to 
practice their own emergency management procedures.  The interviewees did not 
mention anything regarding interagency coordination between the Red Cross and the city.  
The only mention of any interaction occurred when Mayor Maddox visited with Oscar 
Barnes at the Red Cross shelter to check on relief efforts (W. Maddox, personal 
communication, November 26, 2012).  Not inviting other organizations to participate in 
coordinated ICS events as well as the lack of coordination between the two organizations 
during the April 15 tornado, were other examples of missed opportunities by the city and 
the Red Cross, which might have facilitated any interagency coordination during the 
April 27 tornado response. 
 After reviewing the city’s crisis action plan (CAP), it is evident that the city had 
the intent of facilitating interagency coordination through its Liaison Officer.  According 
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to the CAP, the Liaison Officer is responsible for coordinating all communications with 
agency representatives as well as providing information to key crisis communications 
positions during an emergency (“City of Tuscaloosa,” 2008).  Despite identifying a need 
for a Liaison Officer during an emergency, as outlined in the CAP, the city did not 
actually fill the position.  One explanation could be that the city did not have a full-time 
employee to fill the position before the storm hit on April 27.  Another explanation could 
be that the Liaison Officer was no longer needed once the county EMA facility was 
destroyed after the storm.  When the EMA facility was destroyed, agencies no longer had 
a central location to coordinate operations.  Regardless of the reason, utilizing a Liaison 
Officer during a crisis of this magnitude would likely have been beneficial to response 
efforts.  The Liaison Officer would also have facilitated any interagency coordination 
issues that might have arose during the crisis. 
Lastly, the lack of interagency coordination between the Red Cross and the city 
resulted in the absence of an effective interagency contingency plan.  Because the storm 
destroyed the county’s EMA facility along with the Red Cross and Salvation Army 
facilities, some of their initial response plans were rendered useless or ineffective, 
resulting in the struggle of all three organizations during the early phases of the response. 
Additionally, the Red Cross and the Salvation Army were forced to share the same 
shelter facility which caused some challenges for both organizations.  A well coordinated 
and thought out contingency plan might have addressed these issues and mitigated any 
potential conflicts or challenges between the organizations before the storm hit the city. 
Successful crisis management results when organizations build alliances, achieve 
coordination, and share information with their stakeholders (Pearson & Clair, 1998).  It’s 
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also important organizations involve one another when preparing for a disaster.  In this 
case, the city showed intent towards interagency coordination as evidenced by the joint 
FEMA training at Emmitsburg, and the description of the Liaison Officer position in their 
CAP.  Additionally evidence shows that relationships existed at various levels in both 
organizations.  However, a closer examination revealed that neither organization took the 
time to develop this relationship before the storm hit on April 27.  The old sports adage 
goes that “teams play like they practice.”  In the case of the city of Tuscaloosa and Red 
Cross, the lack of interaction and coordination between the two organizations during the 
FEMA training was evident during follow-on training exercises as well as the tornado 
response on April 15.  Ironically, the same lack of coordination was also evident during 
the response following the April 27 tornado.  Lastly, there was no evidence of any 
interagency contingency plans.  If a coordinated contingency plan had been in place, both 
the city and the Red Cross might have mitigated some of the early challenges they faced 
during the initial stages of the response once their initial plans were rendered useless.  
Crisis Communication Performance 
To answer RQ2, analysis focused on the crisis phase of the response.  
Specifically, I looked at how each organization communicated with the public and with 
each other during the response.  During the crisis stage, an organization’s crisis team 
works to contain the effects of the disaster (Mitroff, 1994).  Additionally during this 
stage, organizations need to develop effective crisis response strategies, which are made 
up of words and actions that illustrate the command’s response efforts (Coombs, 2012).  
Coombs emphasizes that organizational responses should be quick, because they not only 
fill the information void, but they also ensure that the organization maintains control of 
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the message and the public receives the “organization’s side of the story” (p. 141).  
Lastly, open two-way communication with stakeholders is important in any crisis.  
Continuous, open, two-way communication between the organization and stakeholders is 
not only the lifeblood of a favorable organizational-stakeholder relationship, it is also 
essential to the crisis management team’s ability to contain, mitigate, and recover from 
the crisis.   
Another important aspect that crisis managers should consider is based on 
reputation management theory (Coombs, 2012).  Specifically, crisis managers need to be 
aware of how the crisis will affect the organization’s reputation.  It is also important for 
crisis managers to understand Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT), which 
posits that stakeholders make attributions about crisis responsibility (Coombs, 2010).  
Stakeholder attributions are important because they eventually shape how stakeholders 
behave toward an organization.  
During the initial stages of any response, operations are oftentimes chaotic as first 
responders attempt to get control of the situation.  What played in the favor of the city 
and the Red Cross was the fact that this crisis was caused by a natural disaster.  
According to Coombs (2012), when evaluating reputational threat, natural disasters fall 
into the victim category, which means that organizations are victims of the crisis and not 
the cause.  Because the city and the Red Cross had no control of this storm, and they also 
were victims of this crisis, they did not have to spend resources defending their 
reputation.  Instead, they could focus on communicating with their stakeholders regarding 
their response efforts.  
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As one can imagine, the tornado on April 27 created unprecedented challenges for 
the city and the Red Cross.  Neither the city nor the Red Cross had any adequate 
coordinated contingency plans that addressed the issues that resulted from this storm.  
Because the majority of their emergency management facilities, infrastructure and 
resources were destroyed by the storm, both organizations were forced to improvise on 
how they would conduct their crisis response.  Despite these challenges, the Red Cross 
and the city were both able to communicate their messages to the media and the public. 
Throughout the response, each organization operated independently of each other, 
with the city running its response operation out of its command center located at City 
Hall, and the Red Cross operating its response out of its shelter, which was located at the 
Belk Center.  Since City Hall had not been damaged by the storm, the mayor and his staff 
were able to capitalize on its existing infrastructure, thus giving emergency management 
personnel the capability to communicate command messages and updates regarding 
response efforts to the public and the media.  City Hall also provided Mayor Maddox a 
suitable location to conduct daily press conferences to discuss the city’s response efforts.  
The city was also able to utilize its electronic billboard system to pass information to 
people who did not have phones or the Internet.  They were able to tweet information 
regarding water, food, and shelter onto the billboards so people could receive this 
information.  
Despite having far fewer resources during the initial stages of the response, Red 
Cross personnel were also able to communicate their message to the media and the 
public.  Unlike the city, which had communications resources such as landline 
telephones, computers, televisions, and printers, Red Cross personnel relied on personal 
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smart phones during the initial phase of the response to coordinate and conduct media 
interviews.  Red Cross members also utilized smart phones to pass sheltering information 
via Twitter and text message to each other and the public.  Because Red Cross personnel 
did not have access to televisions, computers, or printers, they relied heavily on their 
Disaster Operations Center (DOC) in Birmingham to pass command messages and draft 
press releases for them.  If the Red Cross and the city had developed a stronger 
relationship prior to the storm, they might have had better coordination during the 
response.  Better coordination would have resulted in the potential sharing of each other’s 
resources, such as computers, landline telephones, and televisions during the initial stage 
of the response, while they waited for additional organic resources to be provided to them 
by their respective agencies.    
According to Coombs (2012), another vital tool in a crisis manager’s tool box 
during a crisis is the Internet.  The Internet, which includes organizational webpages and 
social media sites, not only allows stakeholders to access organizational information, it 
allows organizations to “communicate their side of the story” (p. 112).  However, having 
an online presence during the crisis is not enough.  It is also important that organizations 
establish an online presence before the crisis.  A pre-crisis online presence not only 
builds credibility with stakeholders, but it also gains followers.  
In the case of this disaster, both the city and the Red Cross had already established 
an online presence through their respective websites and social media pages.  Through its 
website, the city passed routine information to the residents of Tuscaloosa (R. 
Edgeworth, personal communication, December 3, 2012).  Additionally, the city 
established a Facebook page and a Twitter account prior to the storm, recording 100 fans 
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and 1,200 followers respectively.  Because of the city’s established online presence, 
much of the public knew where to look to get information regarding the response, which 
facilitated their response efforts.  Like the city, the Red Cross also communicated through 
online media sources to communicate their response efforts.  As the storm approached 
Tuscaloosa, Dr. Horsley coordinated with weather agencies and local residents via 
Twitter to pass along updates and storm information (S. Horsley, personal 
communication, November 30, 2012).   
One important takeaway from this disaster was how vital a role social media 
played in facilitating the Red Cross’ and the city’s ability to communicate with the media 
and the public.  Because the public used Twitter and Facebook as primary methods to 
communicate information regarding the disaster with one another, social media became a 
crucial tool that the Red Cross and the city utilized to communicate to a mass audience.  
Through social media, the public was able to receive important response information 
about sheltering and where to receive food and water, despite the fact that there were 
widespread power outages and limited to no phone communication.  Based on the lessons 
learned from this disaster, one can not overemphasize the importance of utilizing social 
media during a crisis.  As this case proved, social media might be the only method of 
communication available to first responders to communicate with the public, when other 
traditional communications mediums such as phone lines and cell phones are limited or 
nonexistent.  
Despite getting their respective messages out to the media and the public, both 
organizations ignored one important stakeholder, which was each other.  There was little 
to no involvement or exchange of information evident throughout the crisis response.  
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According to Lynch, “the Red Cross did their thing and we did our thing” (M. Lynch, 
personal communication, December 13, 2012).  When interview participants from the 
Red Cross and the city were asked if they reached out to their counterparts via email, 
phone, or other method, to coordinate information throughout the response, the majority 
said that they had not.  Additionally, when asked if they had coordinated any press 
releases or conducted any joint press conference, the majority also said that they had not.  
Instead, each organization ran its own separate press conferences and media interviews.  
In order to prevent confusion or conflicting information, interview participants stated that 
each organization stayed in its lane and only answered questions that were specific to its 
area of expertise during the response.  When asked if any information that was passed to 
the media by either organization conflicted with one another, the majority of the 
participants said that the information did not conflict.   
In the case of this disaster, both organizations were very fortunate that conflicting 
information was not released to the media during this response.  Especially, considering 
that there was no prior coordination between the organizations before the information 
was released to the public.  If the organizations had coordinated with each other prior to 
releasing any information to the public, they might have guaranteed that no conflicting 
information was being released to the public regarding response efforts. 
Although both agencies were able to communicate to the public, they did 
experience some information management challenges throughout the response.  For 
example, both organizations struggled to communicate early in the response due to the 
lack of operational phone lines and limited cell phone capabilities.  Lack of phone 
capabilities made it difficult to verify the number of fatalities within Tuscaloosa.   It also 
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made it difficult to determine how many people remained missing.  Additionally, both 
organizations had difficulties communicating with first responders in the field to get 
information regarding local aid stations.  Oftentimes, the city would have to send a 
“runner” to an aid station to get information or status updates.  Sending people to the 
field to get information was difficult and time consuming due to closed roads and 
scattered debris.  According to Lynch, many of the organizations involved in this disaster 
ran their own responses with little to no coordination, thus making it difficult for the city 
to get accurate information about the overall response.  Better resource sharing and inter-
agency coordination might have resolved some of these challenges that both 
organizations experienced during the initial stages of the response.  
Additionally, establishing a JIC would have helped with information coordination 
with all agencies involved in this response.  A JIC would have provided a central location 
for information to be collected, analyzed, coordinated among the different PIOs, and 
disseminated to the public.  Additionally, it would have provided a one-stop-shop for 
media to get all their questions answered by the various agencies and organizations 
involved in the response.  If a JIC had been utilized properly, joint press conferences 
could have been conducted to communicate information to the public.  Lastly, any 
messages passed via social media could have been easily coordinated and verified, 
instead of the blind “re-tweeting” of Twitter messages that occurred during the response.  
Because no JIC had been established, media spread out throughout Tuscaloosa to find 
information regarding the disaster, and thus making it more complicated for PIOs to do 
their job.  
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 Despite the lack of resources and extenuating circumstance caused by this storm, 
the Red Cross and the city were both able to communicate their messages to the public 
and the media throughout the response.  They were able to get their messages out to the 
public in a timely manner as well as get their side of the story out.  Although the 
organizations did an effective job communicating with the public, they did a poor job 
communicating with each other.  It is fair to say that internal communications issues and 
interagency communications issues posed the greatest challenge during the response.  
Both organizations struggled early in the crisis due to their lack of communications 
capabilities after the storm.  Some of these challenges might have been resolved if the 
two organizations coordinated better before the crisis, as well as communicated better 
with each other during the crisis. 
Post-Crisis Lessons Learned 
According to Coombs (2012), the final stage in the crisis life cycle is the post-
crisis phase.  In this stage, crises are considered to be resolved and operations return back 
to a normal state.  Additionally, crisis managers continue to keep stakeholders up-to-date 
on business continuity efforts and organizational learning takes place (Coombs, 2010).  
Based on the responses of interview participants, both organizations can take away many 
lessons from this experience, which will only help them plan and prepare for future 
crises.  Both organizations also have a chance to develop their relationship before the 
next storm or disaster strikes.  According to some of the interview participants, the 
lessons learned from this experience have already borne fruit and strengthened the 
relationship between the two organizations.  Based on the results of this case analysis, 
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below are some valuable lessons and takeaways that organizations can use to plan and 
prepare for future crises: 
1. Develop relationships early and often.   
2. Personal and formal relationships are both important. 
3. Strengthen existing relationships. 
4. Don’t discriminate and be inclusive of all organizations during all stages of 
the crisis life cycle.  You never know which organization you will need help 
from during a disaster or emergency. 
5. Know your colleagues and counterparts at other agencies.  This establishes 
mutual trust.  Share a cup of coffee with one another and invite each other to 
organizational meetings.  The more comfortable you are with each other; the 
better off you will be during a crisis.   
6. Know how to get in touch with your counterparts.  
7. Coordinate and collaborate before, during, and after the crisis.   
8. Make sure to maintain open two-way communication with other agencies   
 throughout all stages of the crisis life cycle.  This ensures that expectations 
 are managed, roles and responsibilities are understood, and capabilities and 
 limitations are understood.  Besides, it is difficult to do it all by yourself.  
9.  Never be the senior person with a secret.  Ensure all levels of management    
 and the chain of command are aware potential inter-organizational issues or 
 challenges. 
10.  Create an online presence.  Make sure your colleagues and counterparts are   
 aware of your online presence.  Make sure your public is aware of your  
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 online presence. 
11. Social media will play a vital role in a disaster or crisis.  Use it.  Social media 
 might be your only means to communicate to a mass audience when cell   
 phones and land lines are limited or unavailable.   
12.  Ensure first responders in the field such as PIOs have the capability to send  
 and receive information.  Smart phones or tablets can be a difference maker  
 in the field. 
13.  Have primary and backup plans.  Coordinate your plans with other agencies.  
Make sure you study and rehearse them before the crisis.  Make sure your 
plan allows room for flexibility.  There is no catch all plan for every crisis.  
Also ensure all positions are filled per your CAP before the crisis strikes. 
14. Practice, Practice, Practice.  Practice like you fight!  The best way to improve  
 coordination is to practice together.   
15.  Utilize similar emergency management structures. 
16.  Utilize the JIC.  This will provide a one-stop-shop for the public and media to 
  get information.  It also allows agency PIOs to de-conflict and coordinate  
  information before it gets disseminated. 
17.  Establish formal agreements.  This keeps organizations accountable during a  
 crisis. 
Conclusion 
 The tornado of April 27, 2011 was a once in a generation event that tested the 
emergency response capabilities of the city of Tuscaloosa and the Red Cross.  Despite 
their best efforts to prepare for a natural disaster or emergency, none could have 
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imagined the devastation that followed this storm.  Despite having their resources and 
emergency response capabilities severely limited by the storm, both organizations as well 
as others throughout the community performed heroically as they responded to help their 
fellow citizens.   
The purpose of this case analysis was to analyze the relationship between the Red 
Cross and the City of Tuscaloosa so that other organizations might be better prepared to 
handle a disaster of any magnitude.  This study revealed that organizations cannot handle 
crises or emergencies by themselves.  Additionally, relationships alone are not enough to 
succeed in a crisis.  Strong relationships that are developed over time before a crisis 
strikes will ultimately help facilitate any interagency coordination during a disaster 
response.  Interagency coordination allows for coordinated planning, the sharing of 
resources as well as a thorough understanding of roles, responsibilities, capabilities, and 
limitations, which ultimately leads to more effective crisis management.  Also, 
relationship establishment and interagency coordinating is best done during the peace and 
calm of non-disaster times.  Waiting to establish relationships during the chaos and 
confusion of a crisis is too late because organizations and crisis managers are often times 
juggling multiple items that require their full and immediate attention.  In the end, the 
relationships that organizations establish and develop prior to a crisis, will ultimately lead 
to improved interagency coordination and improved crisis management. 
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APPENDIX A, Data Sources 
 
Primary and Secondary Data Sources 
Primary Data Sources Secondary Data Sources 
Telephone interviews with City of 
Tuscaloosa representatives: 
 
• Mayor Walter Maddox 
Mayor, City of Tuscaloosa 
 
• Robin Edgeworth 
Incident Commander, City of 
Tuscaloosa 
 
• Meredith Lynch 
Public Relations Coordinator, City 
of Tuscaloosa 
Tuscaloosa County Documentation 
 
• Tuscaloosa County Hazard 
Mitigation Plan (2009 Plan Update) 
 
City of Tuscaloosa Documentation 
 
• City of Tuscaloosa Crisis Action 
Plan (July 16, 2008) 
 
• City of Tuscaloosa Tornado 
Recovery Efforts (FAQ) 
 
American Red Cross Documentation 
 
• Red Cross Annual Report (2011) 
 
Online resources 
 
• Websites (Tuscaloosa Forward, 
City of Tuscaloosa, American Red 
Cross, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), National 
Weather Service) 
Telephone interviews with American Red 
Cross representatives: 
 
• Oscar Barnes 
Executive Director of the West 
Alabama Chapter, American Red 
Cross 
 
• Chris Osborne 
Regional Communications Officer, 
American Red Cross 
 
• Dr. Suzanne Horsley 
Public Information Officer, 
American Red Cross 
 
Books and scholarly publications 
 
• Crisis communication literature 
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APPENDIX B, CMC Staff Positions and Responsibilities 
Section of Chapter IV of the City of Tuscaloosa Crisis Action Plan 
 
City of Tuscaloosa Unified Command Structure 
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APPENDIX C, Interview Guide 
 
This interview guide consists of 21 primary questions that are distributed into three 
sections (Pre-crisis, Crisis and Post-crisis phases).  The majority of questions have 
probing questions that will be asked if needed.  The probing questions can be found under 
the primary questions.  I plan to interview individuals from the City of Tuscaloosa and 
the American Red Cross for my research.  All of the questions below will be asked in all 
interviews. 
 
Pre-crisis phase 
 
1.  What was the most recent crisis or disaster that you experienced prior to April 27, 
2011? 
a.  What lessons learned came from that experience? 
b.  Did you incorporate lessons learned prior to April 27, 2011? 
c.  How did the experience from previous disasters help prepare you for the  
     tornado that hit Tuscaloosa on April 27, 2011? 
 
2.  What relationship (formal/informal) existed between the City of Tuscaloosa and the 
American Red Cross prior to April 27, 2011?  
a.  How long has your relationship existed with the American Red Cross prior to  
     April 27, 2011?  
b.  If a relationship existed, was the relationship formal or informal?  For  
     example, did formal memorandums of understanding (MOUs) or 
     memorandums of agreement exist in writing between the two organizations? 
c.  Did your relationship involve disaster preparedness or response? 
d.  If they did not have a relationship, ask them to define what a relationship  
     means.  What does it mean in a crisis perspective? 
 
3.  How would you characterize your relationship with the City/Red Cross prior to April 
27th?   
 
4.  How did you initially establish your relationship with Mayor Maddox? 
 
5.  What challenging issues did you face during the response between the Red Cross and 
the City? 
 
6.  How did your relationship help your through your challenge? 
 
7.  If a formal/informal relationship existed, how frequently did you interact or 
communicate with each other prior to April 27, 2011?  
a.  What type of interaction took place between the City of Tuscaloosa and the   
     American Red Cross prior to April 27, 2011 (email/phone correspondence,  
     meetings, exercises etc.)? 
b.  How frequent were these meetings, exercises etc.? 
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8.  During your training at Emittsburg, how closely did you work with City personnel?  
How did that training help you during the tornado. 
 
9.  What formal/informal relationships existed between the City of Tuscaloosa/American 
Red Cross and other organizations (non-government organizations, private, industry) 
prior to April 27, 2011?  
a.  How long has your relationship existed with these other organizations prior to  
     April 27, 2011? 
b.  Was the relationship formal or informal?  For example, did formal  
     memorandums of understanding (MOUs) or memorandums of agreement exist  
     in writing between the two organizations? 
c.  Did your relationship involve disaster preparedness or response? 
 
10.  What sort of command structure did you have in place for emergency management or 
disaster response prior to April 27, 2011? 
a.  Did your organization use the National Incident Management System (NIMS)  
     prior to April 27, 2011? 
b.  If so, why was NIMS the preferred structure to use prior to April 27, 2011? 
c.  Were there any requirements in place to ensure that your organization  
     conducted exercises with other agencies/organizations in your  
     community/city/county? 
d.  Did your organization have meetings with the City of Tuscaloosa/American  
     Red Cross to discuss disaster response? 
e.  How frequent are these meetings? 
f.  Did your organization conduct training exercises with the American Red Cross  
     prior to April 27, 2011?   
g.  If so, what type of exercises (orientation seminar, drill, tabletop, functional  
     exercise, full-scale exercise)?   
h.  How frequent did you conduct these exercises? 
i.  Where did you conduct these exercises? 
j.  When did you conduct these exercises? 
  
11.  Did your organization have a crisis/disaster management plan prior to April 27, 
2011? 
a.  Did your organization have a crisis communication plan? 
b.  Did your crisis communication plan involve other organizations including the  
     City of Tuscaloosa/American Red Cross? 
c.  What positions are considered critical during crisis response for your  
     organization?  
d.  What positions make up the crisis management team? 
e.   How frequent do personnel turnover or change jobs or positions within your  
     organization? 
f.   How often do personnel in critical crisis response positions turnover or change  
     jobs or positions within your organization? 
 
 
	   110	  
Crisis phase 
 
12.  What was your role during the response? 
a.  How well did you know your team members at your organization? 
b.  Did you work with emergency responders from other organizations? 
c.  How well did you know emergency responders from other organizations? 
d.  Had you conducted any exercises with other emergency responders in the past  
     that you worked with during the response? 
 
13.  Did the City of Tuscaloosa/American Red Cross use NIMS during the crisis 
response? 
a.  When did you initiate NIMS? 
 
14.  Did you use an Incident Command Center (ICC) or Emergency Operations Center 
(EOC) during the response? 
a.  When did you establish the IOC/EOC? 
b.  Where was it located? 
c.  How long did it take to set up? 
d. Was an alternate location for the IOC/EOC established in the event the primary  
    one was not functional/unavailable/damaged/destroyed? 
e.  Where was the alternate location of the IOC/EOC? 
f.  What critical resources were required to have a functioning IOC/EOC? 
g. Were all resources (personnel, equipment, food etc.) available at the time the  
                 IOC/EOC were established? 
h. What additional resources were needed? 
i.  Where could you get additional resources? 
j.  What organizations operated in the IOC/EOC? 
k.  Did the City of Tuscaloosa/American Red Cross operate in the IOC/EOC? 
 
15.  How was information disseminated to the City of Tuscaloosa during the     
response? 
a.  Was a Joint Information Center (JIC) established? 
b.  When was the JIC established? 
c.  Where was the JIC located? 
d.  Did the City of Tuscaloosa/American Red Cross represented in the JIC? 
e.  Who was the PIO for the response? 
f.  What organization was he/she from? 
g.  How was information disseminated between agencies and responders? (Email,  
     phone, other method) 
h.  What methods did you use to communicate Incident Command messages to  
     the residents of Tuscaloosa during the response? 
i.  Were messages jointly drafted or individually released? 
j.  Did you hold press conferences? 
k. Were the press conferences held jointly with other organizations? 
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16.  Were any critical resources or facilities damaged or destroyed, beyond use, due to the 
tornado? 
a.  Did you seek additional resources or assistance from the City of  
     Tuscaloosa/American Red Cross to help with damaged or destroyed resources  
     or facilities? 
b.  Did you seek additional resources or assistance from other organizations to  
     help with damaged or destroyed resources or facilities? 
c.  What critical resources were provided by the City of Tuscaloosa/American  
     Red Cross, which helped you during the response? 
d.  How did you receive critical resources? 
e.  Were pre-existing agreements already in place prior to the storm? 
f.   Did you have to create ad-hoc agreements? 
 
Post-crisis phase 
 
17.  When did you transition from crisis to post-crisis phase? 
 
18.  What are some important lessons learned from the crisis-response? 
a.  What were some of the resource challenges that you experienced during the  
    crisis response? 
b.  What was your biggest challenge between the Red Cross and the City? 
c.  What were some of the interagency communications challenges that you  
     experienced during the crisis response? 
d.  What were some of the logistical challenges that you faced during the crisis  
     response? 
  
19.  What things do you do really well during the response? 
a.  What factors contributed to your success during the response? 
 
20.  What things could you improve on in a future crisis? 
a.  What factors contributed to missteps or failures during the response? 
 
21.  How did established relationships affect all three phases of the crisis? 
a.  Did your established relationships with the City of Tuscaloosa/American Red    
    Cross negatively or positively affect your performance during the crisis? 
b.  How did it affect your performance? 
c.  What is the most important take away for future responses regarding your  
     relationship with the city? 
  d.  Have you implemented any changes since the tornado to ensure that you are  
                 working more closely with the city? 
e.  In what ways did established relationships positively affect or detract from   
     your response efforts? 
f.  Has your relationship strengthened from this experience? 
g.  How do you think it will help you during the next crisis? 
h.  Have you discovered new relationships that need to be established to help you  
     get through a crisis? 
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